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FORUM: SOMERSET'S CASE REVISITED
Somerset's Case and Its Antecedents
in Imperial Perspective
GEORGE VAN CLEVE
James Somerset was taken from Africa as a slave to the Americas in 1749.
He was sold in Virginia to Charles Steuart, a Scottish merchant and slave
trader in Norfolk who served after 1765 as a high-ranking British customs
official. In 1769, Steuart took Somerset with him to England.' After two
years in England, Somerset escaped from Steuart, but was recaptured.
Steuart decided to sell Somerset back into slavery in Jamaica, and, in late
November 1771, Somerset was bound in chains on a ship on the Thames,
the Ann and Mary, awaiting shipment.
Fortunately for Somerset, an ecumenical abolitionist network existed
in London, operating in "close correspondence" with Pennsylvania Quak-
ers.2 At its heart was Granville Sharp, a High Church Anglican. Sharp's
1. For biographical information on Somerset and Steuart, see Mark S. Weiner, "New
Biographical Evidence on Somerset's Case," Slavery and Abolition 23 (2002): 121-36.
2. Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989), 517.
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allies sought a writ of habeas corpus from Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice
of the Court of King's Bench, to obtain Somerset's freedom. Thus began
Somerset's Case, one of the most famous cases in the Anglo-American
law of slavery.'
On June 22, 1772, Mansfield announced a decision in Somerset of about
two hundred words that profoundly altered not just the English, but also
ultimately the American, framework for the law of slavery.4 The proceed-
ings in Somerset were reported in at least thirteen British newspapers,
several widely circulated magazines, and twenty-two out of twenty-four
operating North American colonial newspapers. The case then became
the subject of transatlantic pamphlet wars. Somerset played out before a
transatlantic audience because contemporaries thought it had implications
for England and for its Atlantic colonies. Mansfield fully understood the
imperial context of slavery and made his decision with that context firmly
in mind. Somerset was cited as authority-or disapproved of-by English
and American courts for nearly one hundred years.'
Historians have argued for decades about what Mansfield actually said in
his oral decision and its effects.6 Today's prevailing view on the decision's
narrow holding, which this article strengthens using new evidence, is that
3. R. v. Knowles, ex parte Somerset, (1772) Lofft 1, 98 E.R. 499, 20 S.T. 1. This case
style is the form appropriate to a habeas corpus action. The case is referred to in the English
Reports, and often in the literature, as Somerset v Stewart.
4. Wiecek concluded: "[flew English judicial decisions have figured so prominently in
the growth of American constitutional law .... Somerset long held sway over the thinking
of Americans concerned about the relationship between slavery and law.... [T]o Mansfield
unwittingly was due 'the secret isolated joy of the thinker, who knows that, a hundred years
after he is dead and forgotten, men who have never heard of him will be moving to the
measure of his thought."' William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism
in America, 1760-1848 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 39 (footnote omitted).
5. On the subsequent history for England, see Ruth Paley, "Mansfield, Slavery and the Law
in England, 1772-1830," in Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830, ed. Norma Landau
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 165-84; for the United States, Wiecek,
Antislavery Constitutionalism; Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism
and Comity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).
6. The literature through 1973 is ably discussed by Carol P. Bauer, "Law, Slavery, and
Sommersett's Case in Eighteenth-Century England" (Ph.D. diss., New York University,
1973). Later literature is summarized and discussed in James Oldham, The Mansfield Manu-
scripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1992), 1221-44. More recent discussions of the law of slavery
in England include William R. Cotter, "The Somerset Case and the Abolition of Slavery
in England," History 79 (1994): 31-56; Paley, "Mansfield, Slavery," 165-84; and James
Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2004), 305-23.
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in Somerset Mansfield did not intend to emancipate slaves in England.
Yet this does not mean that Somerset had no significant effect on English
slavery law, and had at most a sort of moral force in rhetorically challeng-
ing slavery.7 Nor does it mean that Somerset had no important imperial
consequences, addressing only slavery in England, while leaving colonial
slavery legally intact.8 As this article argues, Somerset matters because
Mansfield's decision deliberately transformed both the law of slavery in
England and the law governing slavery in England's colonies in subtle but
powerful ways. In addition, it represented the clear emergence of a new
idea of freedom in English law.
This article has two purposes. The first is to interweave the social-his-
torical and legal-historical understandings of slavery in modern England,
placing English slavery in historical context and using a conflict of laws
analysis (focused on how a slave's status changed when the slave came
to England) and new case law interpretations to develop an improved
understanding of the English law of slavery prior to Somerset. A conflict
of laws analysis also shows that arguments over slavery in England were
often also arguments about imperial governance-i.e., the relationship
between English and colonial law.
The second purpose of this article is to offer a new "imperial" inter-
pretation of Somerset using this improved understanding of prior law,
new sources regarding Somerset, and an analysis of its imperial context.
Somerset is best read not simply as a case about the legality of slavery in
England, or as a conflict of laws case, but as an "imperial conflict of laws"
case. These two discussions produce the following conclusions.
First, during the period 1540 to 1771, despite the existence of invol-
untary servitude, Englishmen increasingly defined themselves as free and
unenslaveable, but they encountered Africans outside Africa as "almost
universally enslaved or ... in conditions of extreme subordination." 9
English law complemented this cultural understanding of the disparity
between English and nonEnglish status, particularly for Africans, because
it recognized "slavish servitude" for slaves, usually blacks, who came
to England, an intermediate "near slavery" legal status between "classi-
7. See, for example, Paley, "Mansfield, Slavery."
8. Eliga H. Gould, "Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British
Atlantic, Circa 1772," William and Mary Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2003): 471-510.
9. Michael J. Guasco, "Encounters, Identities, and Human Bondage: The Foundations of
Racial Slavery in the Anglo-Atlantic World" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary,
2000), 8-9.
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cal chattel slavery,"' on the one hand, and full "emancipation"" on the
other. Thus, the dominant view of the status of slaves in England during
this period rejected two polar positions, classical chattel slavery and full
emancipation on arrival in a "free" jurisdiction.
A conflict of laws analysis of English slavery law shows that courts prior
to Somerset generally agreed that English law governed status, but also
limited slavery, for slaves who came to England. Legal rules developed
prior to Somerset created "slavish servitude" or "near slavery" for such
slaves by: (i) rejecting the slave's status under foreign law as a basis for
slavery in England; (ii) preserving powerful economic and physical control
by masters over slaves who came to England; but (iii) nevertheless prohib-
iting masters from inflicting unlimited brutal punishment with impunity.
English "near slavery" shared many characteristics with chattel slavery,
but limited permissible physical brutality toward slaves and may not have
been heritable. It resembled English indentured servitude if one conceives
of that status as including an involuntary, alienable, perpetual form.
Second, in light of the law of slavery in England prior to Somerset there
was little chance that Lord Mansfield would hold in Somerset that English
common law permitted chattel slavery in England. Lord Mansfield's con-
flict of laws analysis, his rejection of chattel slavery, and his continuation
of "near slavery" in Somerset were relatively predictable under earlier law
and would not have made Mansfield's judgment historic.
Third, Lord Mansfield's decision that positive law, not common law,
must authorize slavery both in England and in its colonies, as opposed to
deciding Somerset under English common law and limiting its holding to
10. "Classical chattel slavery" as used here is a Weberian "ideal type" of legal regime
where a slave was deemed property that could be sold, bequeathed, and physically dam-
aged or destroyed with nearly complete impunity by its owner. Chattel slaves were forced
to work and live at a master's arbitrary will. Slave status was perpetual and heritable, and
slaves could not own property or sue in the courts. Slavery in Virginia, for example, during
1660-1770 approached this "ideal type." See Aloyisus Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter
of Color: Race and the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978), 53-58.
11. "Emancipation" as used here is an "ideal type" of legal status where legal disabilities
attached to servile status were removed and where a person's rights and duties in private
labor service were independent of any involuntarily acquired status such as race or gender.
In the seventeenth century, emancipation would have been described as enfranchisement: the
primary meaning of "enfranchise" then was to "set free (a slave or serf)" (Oxford English
Dictionary). Emancipation did not, however, mean "freedom" in the modern sense of pos-
session of an array of political and social rights, or even in the more limited modern sense
of "free labor," but instead meant freedom from legal disabilities that accompanied servile
status as a slave or villein. Steinfeld's description of "liberi homines" conveys a similar
idea. Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1991), 95-96.
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slavery in England only, was a transformative decision. Mansfield's posi-
tive law holding was legally novel, unnecessary to Mansfield's substan-
tive holding in Somerset, seemingly supportive of the status quo, and yet
deliberately subversive of both metropolitan and colonial slavery. This
article contends that Mansfield's holding had both domestic and imperial
political motives, but reflected Mansfield's beliefs as well. As to English
domestic politics, Mansfield's holding was an effort to eliminate slavery
litigation in the English courts and to commit the slavery issue to Parlia-
ment. As to imperial politics, Mansfield's positive law holding avoided a
difficult imperial governance problem, but did so by exacting a substantial
price from colonial slaveholders.
To appreciate fully the implications of the positive law aspect of Mans-
field's decision, its imperial context must be understood. For the better part
of a century, England had engaged in disputes with its Atlantic colonies
about whether, and to what extent, English law applied in them, disputes
over the "transatlantic constitution" that deepened during the 1760s and
"remained up to the eve of the Revolution." 2 Moreover, before Somerset
English courts thought that since slaves were a form of property, slavery
was based on common law principles. But there was a fundamental un-
certainty underlying the colonial law of slavery-was colonial slavery
established (or governed) by English statutes, by the Crown prerogative (or
derivative colonial laws subject to limits on repugnancy to English law),
by English common law (which arguably limited the Crown prerogative),
or by some combination of these authorities? This uncertainty about co-
lonial slavery was an important aspect of the larger uncertainty about the
transatlantic constitution. 3
Two major eighteenth-century English judges, Chief Justice Holt and
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, had differed sharply on whether the common
12. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the
Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 39. Bilder's account contains an
excellent discussion of the sources of this uncertainty in earlier English law.
13. The English courts played an important role in such governance disputes, includ-
ing slavery disputes, throughout the eighteenth century because, among other things, they
established the limits of the Crown prerogative. An excellent example of this role was
Mansfield's 1774 decision in Campbell v. Hall, (1774) I Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045, deter-
mining that Grenada was a settlement to which English common law applied and that the
Crown prerogative therefore could not be used to tax, a "vital confirmation of [colonial]
rights against the Crown prerogative." Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The
American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2000), 131. This was true despite the fact that much of the colonial law of slavery in
the empire was established through the Crown prerogative. Jonathan A. Bush, "The British
Constitution and the Creation of American Slavery," in Slavery & the Law, ed. Paul Finkel-
man (Madison: Madison House, 1997), 379-418.
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law of slavery in England was independent from the law of slavery in the
colonies, and Blackstone had addressed that issue shortly before Mansfield
reluctantly faced it in Somerset. 14 By 1772, this dispute had become a hotly
contested aspect of the broader issue of metropolitan-colonial governance.
Slavery, and particularly the slave trade, were increasingly controversial
in England and North America, a political reality that Mansfield had to
balance against Britain's interest in the benefits of the trade and the al-
legiance of certain colonies that depended heavily on it, particularly the
West Indies. To reconcile these conflicting interests, Mansfield avoided
the issue of the relationship between English common law and colonial
law on slavery by characterizing slavery as arising from positive law.
Mansfield's positive law holding politically benefited the West Indies
and the southern North American colonies in the short run. In what was
only a seeming paradox, however, Mansfield's holding also deliberately
devalued colonial slave property, handing slaveowners a "poisoned chal-
ice." This article posits that Mansfield was well aware that this holding
would have a series of adverse legal, political, and economic consequences
for colonial slavery.
Mansfield's transformation of the conceptual basis of slavery in English
law was important for another reason: it represented the clear emergence in
English law of a new English idea of freedom. This new idea of freedom was
that in England, core legal freedoms such as access to the courts and protec-
tion from arbitrary, unlimited physical abuse, were available to all subjects
as "rights of man," not dependent upon birth, race, religion, or free status,
and could only be denied by statute or express, longstanding custom.
The first part of this article discusses the social conditions and the ju-
dicially sanctioned legal status of black "near slaves" in England prior to
Somerset. It considers the significance of the popular myth that coming to
England emancipated slaves and of England's legal conception of slaves
in the slave trade. It then reinterprets the case law on slavery prior to
Somerset and relates it to social conditions and imperial governance. The
second part of this article analyzes Somerset. It reconstructs key argu-
ments and the judgment in Somerset using new materials, such as recently
discovered newspaper reports and a new report of a key subsequent case,
R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton. This part of the article then analyzes
Lord Mansfield's judgment and its imperial political and legal context. It
14. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke attacked Holt's position in Pearne v. Lisle, (1749) Amb.
75, 27 E.R. 47 (see below, 620-21). For Blackstone's position, see William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765; facsimile ed., Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) (hereafter B1. Comm.), 1:104-5, 123 (see below,
612).
Somerset's Case
concludes by discussing the decision's effects on slavery in England and
in the colonies.
I. Slavery in England and the Law, 1540-1771
This part considers the social and legal history of slavery in England in the
two centuries prior to Somerset. It shows that black involuntary servitude,
in particular, did not fit well within contemporary concepts of slavery or
"service." In dealing with slaves who came to England, English society
and the law avoided the extremes: the law did not emancipate such slaves,
but neither did it continue their prior status as chattel slaves. Instead, such
involuntary immigrants became "slavish servants," that is, "near slaves"
with a legal position somewhat akin to that of involuntary, alienable per-
petual indentured servants. 5
The Rise of the Culture of "Near Slavery" in England
A substantial part of all labor performed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century England was coerced or "unfree" labor. Substantial physical force
and imprisonment could be used to compel performance, and in many
cases no wages were paid for service. 6 However, seventeenth-century
Englishmen never imposed slave "status on members of their own com-
munity."' 7 As a sense of distinctively English identity developed during
this period, Englishmen increasingly came to view themselves as free and
unenslaveable by virtue of their English birth and "race."' 8 Yet by 1600,
English culture had not necessarily rejected socially "redemptive" human
bondage for Englishmen and would have accepted enslavement or cognate
involuntary servitude of Africans, among others. 9
One distinctive aspect of coerced labor in England was the rise of black
involuntary servitude there during the late sixteenth through the eighteenth
15. For the general characteristics of indentured servitude, see Steinfeld, Free Labor,
44-47.
16. Douglas Hay, "England, 1562-1875: The Law and Its Uses," in Masters, Servants
and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, ed. Douglas Hay and Paul Craven
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 59-116, 67, 78; David Eltis, "Labour
and Coercion in the English Atlantic World from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth
Century," in The Wages of Slavery, ed. Michael Twaddle (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1993),
208.
17. Eltis, "Labour and Coercion," 211.
18. Guasco, "Encounters," 188.
19. Ibid., 6-9, 67-68, 244-50.
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centuries z.2 English black "near slavery" was largely a result of the Eng-
lish slave trade and was a comparatively minor, though significant, social
phenomenon.2 ' Recent accounts emphasize that the black experience in
England was not monolithic: in the Tudor era, there were at least some
English blacks who were not "slaves or servants," while later blacks who
lived in England served as "slaves, servants, drudges and entertainers.
2
Surveying the black experience in England in the eighteenth century, Bush
concluded that most blacks there were "neither clearly slave nor clearly
free ... . "23
Many aspects of black servitude in England were consistent with the
cultural attitudes and coerced labor conditions in English society at the
time, as described by writers such as Steinfeld and Guasco. But other as-
pects of black servitude did not fit well within then-current legal models
for slavery or involuntary servitude, and it appears to have had distinctive
cultural features.2 4 The available evidence suggests that black involuntary
servitude in England was neither classical chattel slavery, nor socially "re-
demptive" slavery, but was instead "slavish servitude" or "near slavery,"
a status considerably more onerous than English indentured servitude as
Steinfeld described it.
There is little if any evidence that classical chattel slavery existed in
England during the period 1540-1771: there were no statutes that permitted
or endorsed such slavery in England based on status or race, 25 and there
20. General treatments of black slavery in England are found in Guasco, "Encounters";
Peter Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain, 2d ed. (London: Pluto
Press, 1985); Folarin 0. Shyllon, Black Slaves in Britain (London: Oxford University Press
for Institute of Race Relations, 1974); James Walvin, Black and White: The Negro and
English Society, 1555-1945 (London: Penguin, 1973); Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and
Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1986); James Walvin, Britain's Slave Empire (Stroud: Tempus, 2000).
21. Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 26-29.
22. Guasco, "Encounters," 244-50.
23. Bush, "British Constitution and Slavery," 389. In both the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, persons who were unquestionably chattel slaves were often referred to as "ser-
vants," as in the Royal African Company euphemism "perpetual servants," so terminology
must be considered in context to understand status.
24. It does not appear that in England during this period involuntary servants other than
blacks were sold in public markets, routinely forced to wear unremoveable collars denoting
their status as owned property (and painted into aristocratic portraits in such collars), denied
baptism, or shipped out of the country into slavery as punishment. See Guasco, "Encoun-
ters," 231-405, and works cited above, n. 20, for the evolution of English attitudes toward
Africans in various contexts during this period.
25. The Vagrancy Act 1547, 1 Edw. 6 c.3, based enslavement on "criminal" vagrancy,
not civil status, and is therefore irrelevant. For its history, see C. S. L. Davies, "Slavery and
Protector Somerset: The Vagrancy Act of 1547," The Economic History Review, 2d set, 20
(1966): 533-49.
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was no reported English case that unequivocally endorsed heritable, per-
petual chattel slavery in England based on status or race. 26 But the social
reality was that, during most of those same two centuries, a form of "near
slavery," mostly involving blacks, with many incidents of chattel slavery,
such as sales, imprisonment or forcible shipment abroad for discipline 27
or punishment, collaring, chaining, 28 and wageless compelled perpetual
service, did exist in England. 29 Although the evidence is limited, it ap-
pears that the major distinction between colonial chattel slavery and such
English "near slavery" was that under chattel slavery, the use of consider-
ably more brutal physical force against slaves, including dismemberment
and extremely severe whippings (sometimes called "scourgings"), was
permitted as compared to the limited, though substantial force that would
probably have been legally permissible against "near slaves" in England
at the time.3" It is also unclear whether English "near slavery" was deemed
a heritable status, while chattel slavery was heritable.
By the close of the English Civil War, black slavery "was becom-
ing common" in England, and blacks were regarded as "'purchaseable
commodit[ies]."' 3' For example, Samuel Pepys's Navy Board colleagues
brought black slaves back to England in the 1650s, and Pepys himself later
owned and sold slaves.32 Beginning in the second half of the seventeenth
26. Some would make an exception for Scottish colliers. Eltis, "Labour and Coercion,"
209-10.
27. Granville Sharp attacked the "tyrannical and dangerous" practice of disciplinary
imprisonment. Granville Sharp, A Representation of the Injustice and Dangerous Tendency
of Tolerating Slavery or of Admitting the Least Claim of Private Property in the Persons of
Men in England (London, 1769), 90.
28. Morgan Godwyn, Trade Preferr'd before Religion and Christ Made to Give Place
to Mammon (London, 1685), 4-5 (chaining followed by forcible shipment to colonies to
avoid baptism).
29. Also see above, n. 24.
30. By the late seventeenth century, masters were limited to reasonable force in "correct-
ing" apprentices. R. v. Keller, (1683) 2 Shower 289, 89 E.R. 545; Keat's Case, (1696) Skin.
666, 90 E.R. 298. There were claims as early as the 1670s that limits on use of physical force
against apprentices applied to everyone in England, including former slaves. Charles Molloy,
De Jure Maritimo Et Navali or, a Treatise of Affairs Maritime and of Commerce (London,
1676), 356. These claims may have had some merit. The argument that punishment even of
slaves was limited was supported by Cartwright's Case (1569?), J. Rushworth, Historical
Collections, 468 (London, 1686), and this limitation was conceded by slaveholder counsel
in Somerset. Although Viner's 1746 Abridgement recognized a claim of trover (damages
for unlawful property conversion, see below, n. 62, for details), for "Negroes" (slaves) it
did not contain separate rules governing physical punishment for Negroes. Charles Viner,
A General Abridgement of Law and Equity (Aldershot, 1746), 1:240 (13); 20:425 (8).
31. Larry D. Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados
1627-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 117.
32. Claire Tomalin, Samuel Pepys: The Unequalled Self (New York: A. A. Knopf, 2002),
123, 177.
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century there were newspaper "hue and cry" advertisements to sell or recover
slaves in England.33 An advertisement from The London Gazette of March
1685, for example, sought return of a "black boy" who wore an unremove-
able silver neck collar engraved with his owner's "coat-of-arms and cipher."'
English artisans made a "thriving living" from such collars, advertised in
one case as being "silver padlocks for Blacks or Dogs .... -35
Slave markets where "black men, women and children were sold ...
existed in Liverpool, Bristol, Glasgow and London,3 6 though such markets
were comparatively small and the length of time for which they existed
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is uncertain. English slave
sales continued at least through the time of Somerset.37 The private use of
limited, but substantial force against slaves also continued until the time
of Somerset. A slaveowner used force against a nine-year-old slave girl
during a London church service in 1760 to prevent her baptism.38 Granville
Sharp became involved in abolitionism in 1765 after he nursed back to
health a slave, Jonathan Strong, who had been beaten nearly to death by
his owner, David Lisle, who was not prosecuted.3 9
Historians have estimated that somewhere between three thousand and
fifteen thousand blacks lived in England by 1772, a significant fraction of
them in perpetual involuntary servitude as slaves or, as suggested here,
"near slaves," though the data are open to interpretation.4 °
33. Folarin 0. Shyllon, "The Black Presence and Experience in Britain: An Analytical
Overview," in Essays on the History of Blacks in Britain, ed. J. S. Gundara and I. Duffield
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 203-4.
34. Shyllon, Black Slaves, 9.
35. Walvin, Black and White, 60.
36. Shyllon, "Black Presence," 203.
37. Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 174 n. 34 (Liverpool 1766, II slaves); Prince
Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, Esq., 2d ed. (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 73-75
(London 1769); Walvin, Britain's Slave Empire, 62 (1771 estate sale).
38. Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 188 n. 24.
39. The assault could have been prosecuted privately or publicly. Oldham, English Com-
mon Law, 260. Lisle then sued Sharp for damages for theft of his slave. Sharp discovered
that his prominent counsel, and other authorities he consulted such as William Blackstone,
believed Sharp had no defense to Lisle's action. Hoare, Memoirs, 48-53, 55, 59.
40. Shyllon, "Black Presence," 203 (not less than 10,000 slaves by 1772, though pre-
cise data are lacking); Norma Myers, Reconstructing the Black Past: Blacks in Britain,
1780-1830 (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 20, 35 (contemporary estimates of 20,000 or more
London "Negro servants" by 1764; concludes that empirical data suggest between 5,000
and 10,000 blacks in London in 1780, an unknown number of whom were slaves).
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England as Emancipator and Slave Trader
Despite the social reality of "near slavery" in England through the time
of Somerset, England had an apparently contradictory and longstanding
popular tradition that a slave's coming to England by itself resulted in the
slave's emancipation. Yet English law also permitted English citizens,
living in England, to participate in every aspect of the Atlantic slave trade.
This section discusses England's roles as "emancipator" and "slave trader"
and then shows how the law reconciled these apparently contradictory
social practices and beliefs by creating "near slavery" for slaves brought
to England.
England as emancipator. By 1600, villeinage was nearly extinct. 41 One
question this raised was whether English law would free slaves who came
to England. Steinfeld described the growth of an English tradition cel-
ebrating English freedom and condemning villeinage and slavery.42 In his
widely circulated Description of England, for example, in 1577 William
Harrison asserted that England emancipated slaves who came there: "all
note of servile bondage is utterly removed from them. 43
The claim that England emancipated imported slaves was repeated in
later centuries. Despite the fact that at least one very knowledgeable con-
temporary of Harrison's did not endorse his position,4 4 a series of seven-
teenth- and early eighteenth-century commentators echoed Harrison, but
generally with the important qualification that such emancipation did not
eliminate obligations to provide "ordinary service." 45 As discussed below,
in the case of imported slaves, this service obligation often meant perpetual,
alienable involuntary servitude.
41. Diarmid MacCulloch, "Bondmen under the Tudors," in Law and Government under
the Tudors, ed. M. Claire Cross, David M. Loades, and J. J. Scarisbrick (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988), 91-109. Villeinage was a common law unfree legal status,
a form of hereditary, lifetime involuntary servitude, distinguished from slavery by the fact
that the villein had the rights of a freeman against persons other than his master, and very
limited rights against the master himself. Villeins were sometimes termed "chattels" (a
form of property), an "imperfect analogy," but a lord's rights over villeins could be bought
and sold. See John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London:
Butterworths, 2002), 468-72 (quotation at 469).
42. Steinfeld, Free Labor, 96-102.
43. Georges Edelen, ed., The Description of England by William Harrison (Washington:
Folger Shakespeare Library and Dover Inc., 1994), 118.
44. Sir Thomas Smith's De Republica Anglorum was first published in the 1580s. If the
law emancipated slaves once in England, one would expect Smith to have known about
it and to have said so, and he did not. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Mary Dewar
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 137-38.
45. In 1669 Edward Chamberlayne claimed that slaves brought to England occupied an
intermediate legal status: "free, but not from ordinary service." Edward Chamberlayne,
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In the first edition of his Commentaries, Blackstone asserted that under
the common law slaves were emancipated upon coming to England.4 6
Blackstone later modified his text on this point, some claim under pressure
from Lord Mansfield, others claim for editorial consistency.47 Blackstone
also asserted that the North American colonies were not English settlements
but instead conquests, so that they were not governed by English common
law, but by the royal prerogative.48 For Blackstone, the law on slavery in
England was independent of the law on slavery in the colonies.
England as slave trader. Between 1650 and 1787, Parliament and the
Crown provided unbroken support for the English slave trade. During the
eighteenth century, English traders transported approximately 3 million
slaves from Africa to the Americas. 49 English citizens, while living in
England, were permitted to participate in every aspect of the trade. During
the period 1600-1750 blacks were treated as a form of property in a variety
of English transactions stemming from the slave trade. The Crown legal
position from 1677 onward was that blacks were goods under the Naviga-
tion Acts, 50 a position endorsed by Chief Justice Holt and the major judges
of England in a 1689 formal opinion. 5' In 1698, Parliament exempted only
Angliae Notitia, or the Present State of England (London, 1669), 514. This statement
remained unchanged in editions of Chamberlayne's work to the mid-eighteenth century.
Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 185 n. 5. Charles Molloy's position was similar:
chattel slavery in England was unlawful, and an action of trover (an action to recover dam-
ages for property, see below, n. 62) could not be brought for a man there, but contracts for
lifetime service were lawful. Charles Molloy, De Jure Maritimo Et Navali, or a Treatise of
Affairs Maritime and of Commerce, 4th ed. (London, 1690), 355-56. In a 1704 popularizing
introduction to the civil law, Thomas Wood relied on the writing of Arnold Vinnius for the
proposition that slaves became entirely free upon coming to England. Thomas Wood, A New
Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law (London, 1704), 37-38, citing Arnoldi Vinnii J.C. in
Quatuor Libros Institutionum Imperialum Commentarius Academicus & Forensis, 4th ed.
(Amsterdam, 1695), 25, ad J. Inst. 1.3.3., Manu capiuntur. (I thank Michael Macnair for
providing and translating the Vinnius reference.) Vinnius asserted that emancipation was
the rule in several European countries, but did not claim that that rule applied in England.
A broad reading of Smith v. Browne and Cooper (see below, 617), however, would sup-
port Wood's position.
46. Bl. Comm., 1: 123.
47. Compare Edward Fiddes, "Lord Mansfield and the Sommersett Case," Law Quarterly
Review 50 (1934): 499-511, 506-7, with Shyllon, Black Slaves, 55-76, and discussion in
Oldham, English Common Law, 316-17.
48. Bl. Comm., 1:104-5.
49. Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 33.
50. Kenneth G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London: Longmans, Green, 1957),
331-32.
51. 11 November 1689 opinion of Holt and nine other judges, Public Record Office (now
part of the United Kingdom National Archives) (hereafter PRO) CO 137/2.
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"negroes" from import duties on "all Goods and Merchandize" coming
to England or the colonies.52 English contracts and insurance agreements
stemming from the slave trade also rested on the premise that blacks were
goods.53 In 1732, Parliament legislatively classified slaves as a preferred,
hybrid, form of property to induce and protect English investment in the
slave trade.
5 4
It is a fair inference that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries no one of influence in England thought that treating black slaves
in the colonies as property was inconsistent with English common law. The
case law discussed below suggests that this was because English law often
accepted explicitly or implicitly the idea that blacks could be property in
England as well, though why-and to what extent-this was so, and the
relation between English and colonial law, were matters of dispute.
The Law of Slaves in England, 1540-1771
Against the social reality of "near slavery" in England and the seemingly
contradictory popular belief that English law emancipated slaves who came
to England, what did the law have to say about slavery in England?55 Earlier
studies of the law of slaves in England before Somerset concluded that the
law was in "hopeless disagreement," "a confusing state of disarray," or
"unsettled."56 But the perceived confusion in the law resulted largely from
the question generally asked: was "slavery" in England "legal"? If instead
one asks questions stemming from a conflict of laws perspective, the law
of slavery in England between 1540 and 1770 appears considerably less
confused. These questions include: What did "slavery" mean in England
during this period? What law governed the status of a slave who came to
52. An Act To Settle the Trade to Africa, (1698) 9&10 Will. III, c. 26.
53. Davies, Royal African Company, 294-95.
54. An Act for the more easy Recovery of Debts in His Majesty's Plantations and Colonies
in America, (1731/2) 5 Geo. II, c. 7.
55. Although the separation of law and equity courts generally limits the use of precedents
from equity in common law courts (Baker, Introduction, 97, 115), counsel and the court in
Somerset cited precedents from both jurisdictions, and this article follows their example.
56. Fiddes, "Sommersett Case," 499; William M. Wiecek, "The Origins of the Law of
Slavery in British North America," Cardozo Law Review 17 (1996): 1711-85, 1725; James
C. Oldham, "New Light on Mansfield and Slavery," Journal of British Studies 27 (1988):
45-68, 48. Holdsworth and Baker suggest that the common law had an "open mind" about
slavery at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when villeinage essentially ended as
a social institution. William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Methuen,
n.d.), 3:507-8; John H. Baker, The Common Law Tradition: Lawyers, Books and the Law
(London: Hambledon Press, 2000), 334.
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England? If enslavement ended when a slave came to England, did this
necessarily result in the slave's full emancipation? The answers follow.
Most courts and legal authorities during this period were in broad agree-
ment that: first, the common law did not recognize classical chattel slavery
in England; second, the status of slaves who came to England was gov-
erned by English law; third, slaves who came to England were no longer
subject to chattel slavery, but were not fully emancipated; they were held
to a lesser but substantial form of "slavish servitude" that constituted "near
slavery."
Case law on slaves, 1569-1689. No statute enacted between 1540 and
1780 spoke directly to the legal status of slaves brought to England, so the
fate of slaves there was left to the courts and the common law.
57
Cartwright's Case, apparently decided circa 1569, might support the posi-
tion that slaves who came to England were emancipated. In Cartwright, a
court was reported to have said, in sustaining a challenge to a slaveowner' s
desire to "scourge" a Russian slave brought to England, that "England was
too pure an air for Slaves to breath [sic] in."58 When it first appeared in later
law, however, Cartwright was regarded as establishing limits on punishment
of slaves in England, not as providing emancipation. 59Thus, the emancipa-
tion tradition discussed above actually meant limits on owners' rights to
brutalize slaves, not the elimination of "near slavery," a view confirmed
by the late seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century case law.
60
A well-known series of slavery cases occurred between 1677-1706. Al-
though, as past writers have noted, these cases sharply disagree on whether
slaves brought to England could be a form of common law property, it
is equally important to understand where they agree with each other. In
particular, it is important to understand what the cases say about chattel
slavery, emancipation, and governing law, as well as what legalleconomic
rules control slaves in England.
The earliest reported English case on the legal status of slaves in Eng-
land (after Cartwright's Case) was Butts v. Penny.61 In Butts, a claimant
57. But see above, 612-13.
58. An unattributed hearsay report is J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1686),
468-69.
59. John Lilburne's counsel relied on it in 1645 in arguing that the severity of Lilburne's
whipping exceeded lawful bounds. The Trial of Lilburne and Wharton, in A Complete Collec-
tion of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors
from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Other Illustrations, ed. Thomas
B. Howell (London: T. C. Hansard, 1816-26) (hereafter S.T.), 3:1353-54.
60. Cartwright's Case was not relied on in any of the English slavery cases prior to
Somerset's Case. See also above, n. 30.
61. Butts v. Penny, (1677) 2 Lev. 201, 83 E.R. 518, 3 Keb. 785, 84 E.R. 1011, (as Anon.)
Somerset's Case
to co-ownership of slaves brought trover for "10 negroes and a halfe.... "
The court held that an action of trover would lie.62 The Levinz and Keble
reports of Butts stated that treating "negroes" as goods under English law
was acceptable because merchants treated them as goods, which in turn
was acceptable because "negroes" were infidels. Butts apparently rejected
the contention that under English law no one could have greater property
rights in a man than a lord had over his villein. Yet under the decision's
reasoning, slavery in England could not have been classical chattel slav-
ery, heritable, or permanent, because baptism would enfranchise slaves.
63
Moreover, the court's reasoning could readily have been applied to slavery
in all English colonies. 64 Thus, instead of approving chattel slavery in
England, Butts created an uncertain legal climate for colonial slaveholders
and English investors.65
Butts was an influential view of the law on slaves at the time. Courts and
counsel relied on it through the mid-1690s, and it was cited by counsel as
useful, though questioned, authority as late as 1721 in argument before all
the major judges of England. 66 Another 1677 trover case, Lowe v. Elton,
reached the same result and employed the same religious rationale.67 Butts
was also consistent with a 1694 trover decision by the Court of Common
Pleas in Gelly v. Cleve.6 1 Butts was also cited as authority for the proposi-
tion that trover would lie for a "Negro" in 1746 by Viner's Abridgement;
Chief Justice Holt's decisions, discussed below, rejecting Butts were treated
as a dissenting view. 69 In the eighteenth century, the property principle of
I Freem. 452, 89 E.R. 338, Bodleian Library MS Rawl. C. 823 fo. 341. The attorney general
intervened, so no judgment was entered, but the intervention probably had only to do with
the type of property at issue (see below, n. 81).
62. A trover action was a claim for damages on the basis that personal property owned
by the plaintiff had been wrongfully withheld ("converted") from plaintiff by the defendant.
One predicate for that action was that the thing claimed was legally deemed property. On
the history of trover, see Baker, Introduction, 397-99; Holdsworth, History, 7:401-47.
63. Walvin, Black and White, 110.
64. Ibid.
65. Bauer, "Law, Slavery," 6.
66. Wedgewood and Others v. Bayly, (1682) 2 Show. 177, 89 E.R. 874, 1 Freem. 532, T.
Raym. 463, Skin. 39 (several judges of court acknowledge Butts precedent in survivorship
case); Chambers v. Warkhouse, (1693) 3 Lev. 336, 83 E.R. 717; Pickering v. Appleby, (1721)
1 Com. 355, 92 E.R. 1109 (counsel cite Butts as precedent in trover dispute [Chambers]
and in case raising question whether stock was a form of goods [Pickering]).
67. Baker, Introduction, 475, citing Lowe v. Elton, (1677) Girdler's entries, Cambridge
University Library MS Add. 9430 (2) 373.
68. Gelly v. Cleve, (1694) 1 Ld. Raym. 147, 91 E.R. 994 (hearsay report). The report of
Lowe v. Elton contains a consistent account of what appears to be the Gelly case sub nom.
Cleve v. Jolliffe.
69. Viner, General Abridgement, 1:240 (13).
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Butts was followed in an influential, widely circulated Opinion of the Law
Officers and in Pearne v. Lisle, both discussed below.
The law of slaves in England, 1690-1771. Between 1696 and 1706, in a
series of cases contrary to Butts v. Penny, Chief Justice Holt held that men
in England could not be chattels under English law.7" Although it was (and
is) widely believed that Holt also declared that slaves were emancipated
by coming to England, this misreads Holt's (or at least his court's) actual
position. In a series of decisions, the Court of King's Bench under Holt
provided relatively strong legal protection to owners for their property in
what it deemed "slavish servants" when they came to England, rather than
emancipating them.7'
In 1696, Holt decided his first major slave case, Chamberlaine v. Har-
vey.7 Chamberlaine was an action of trespass de bonis asportatis seeking
damages for the loss of value and services of a slave brought to England
from Barbados.73 Chamberlaine held that trespass would not lie for the
taking away of the slave but only a "special" action of trespass per quod
servitium amisit.74 Under English law, a "negro cannot be demanded as
a chattel."7 5 The court refused to base the slave's status in England on
Barbados law.
Equally importantly, the court did not declare the slave emancipated.
Instead, it provided masters of what it termed "slavish servants" with a
70. Holt had, however, held that "negroes are merchandize" under the Navigation Acts.
See above, n. 51.
71. In two cases that are instructive though they lack precedential effect, the 1690 case
of Katherine Auker and the 1717 case of John Ceaser, Sessions Courts presided over by
lay judges treated slaves as if they were neither fully slave nor free, and similarly to ap-
prentices. The courts took jurisdiction as if the slaves were servants and ordered limited
relief for both petitioners. Yet in both cases they declined to discharge petitioners from
service, or order compensation, though in both cases the facts alleged would have justified
such results. Auker had been imprisoned by her master and also alleged torture. Sessions
Books No. 472, Middlesex County (February 1690). William J. Hardy, Middlesex County
Records (London, 1905), 6. Ceaser had not been paid wages in fourteen years. Middlesex
Records Calendar, September & October 1717.
72. Chamberlaine v. Harvey, (1696) 5 Mod. 182, 87 E.R. 596, 1 Ld. Raym. 146, 91 E.R.
994, Carth. 396, 90 E.R. 830.
73. The trespass writs discussed in this section belong to a group of writs used to make
claims for civil wrongs. The specific phrase used in a particular trespass writ described the
wrong, which in turn usually entailed proof of specific elements, and delimited damages
recoverable for the wrong. For example, while trespass de bonis asportatis sought damages
for the carrying away of goods, which could include their value, trespass per quod servitium
amisit ("whereby he lost the service" [of his servant]) was a writ used by a master to claim
damages for the loss of a servant's services, but could not be used to claim damages for
injuries suffered by the servant.
74.5 Mod. 190.
75. Carth. 397, 90 E.R. 830.
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trespass claim against parties who deprived them of the service of such
servants. 76 The court did not explain why any master of a slave imported to
England would have such a claim unless involuntary servitude continued
in England, but why did involuntary servitude continue if slavery did not?
The court's judgment thus appears to have been a compromise.
Carthew's report said that the court held that a master could not recover
either for the "value" of a servant or for "damages done to his servant,"
but only for the "loss of his service. ' 77 The economic impact of this rule
on slaveowners was uncertain. One possible interpretation, that the rule
authorized damages for the difference between the cost of a slave's ser-
vices and the cost of replacement services, might have limited a master's
damages when compared to recovery of "value," but such damages could
still often have been substantial enough to deter third parties from hiring
"slavish servants" away without an owner's consent, thus maintaining
involuntary servitude. If the rule had been read to limit damages merely
to costs resulting from disruption of service until a replacement servant
was hired, it would have rendered many masters unable to keep slaves in
England, since the damages available would have been trivial in compari-
son to the master's economic loss. Even viewed most favorably to slave-
owners, the Chamberlaine court made importation of slaves into England
more costly, and limited owners' power over them, without declaring the
slaves emancipated. A few years later, slaveowners' economic control was
markedly strengthened in Smith v. Gould.
Early in the reign of Queen Anne, in Smith v. Browne and Cooper, Holt
held that it was not possible in England to bring an action of indebitatus
assumpsit for the value of a slave sold to a buyer where the sale was
pleaded to be in England and the slave was pleaded to be in England.78
But Holt then instructed the plaintiff that he should have pled that the
contract occurred while the "negro" was in Virginia, because the law there
was not English common law, but instead was based on the royal preroga-
tive.79 Use of that pleading fiction, which permitted sales of slaves when in
76. An earlier analysis of Chamberlaine also concluded that the court determined the
slave was like a "bound or apprenticed laborer, 'a slavish servant,' a human being whose
freedom was restricted but not annihilated." William M. Wiecek, "Somerset: Lord Mansfield
and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World," University of Chicago Law
Review 42 (1974): 86-174, 91.
77. Carth. 397, 90 E.R. 830.
78. Smith v. Browne and Cooper, (1702x1706) 2 Salk. 666, 91 E.R. 567, 2 Ld. Raym.
1274, 92 E.R. 338. Indebitatus assumpsit was a form of breach of contract action.
79. Smith v. Browne and Cooper; see Gavin Loughton, "The Extension of English Law
Following Conquest and Settlement: The Origins of the Colonies Rule" (M. Phil. thesis,
University of Oxford, 2001), 4.
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England, weakened Holt's practical position but preserved his theoretical
position that slavery per se was not recognized by English law.8" Holt's
fictional distinction between Virginia law and English law avoided a court
conflict over the permissibility of slave sales in England under English
law, confirmed Holt's desire to maintain the position that colonial law and
English law on slavery were independent, and showed the fragility of that
position.
81
In Browne and Cooper, Holt also famously stated that "as soon as a
negro comes into England, he becomes free: one may be a villein in Eng-
land, but not a slave." 82 However, it does not appear that Holt thereby
endorsed the position that arrival in England meant an end to any labor
servitude, though the decision can be and has often been read that way.
Holt appeared to mean instead that a slave who came to England could
not be treated as a "pure" chattel, and thus destroyed with impunity, but
was instead like a villein, who had limited rights vis-A-vis his lord despite
his servile labor and property status. This narrower reading makes Smith
v. Browne and Cooper consistent with Chamberlaine and is confirmed by
Smith v. Gould.
In Smith v. Gould, the court declined to permit a trover action for a
black,83 but in a significant change, the court held that an alternative action,
trespass quare captivum suum cepit, would be available. It seems clear that
by "slave," the court meant a servant whose master would have a right
to kill or maim it with impunity (i.e., a "pure" chattel).84 Smith v. Gould
substantially strengthened a slaveowner's damages position. In trespass
quare captivum suum cepit, "the plaintiff might give in evidence that the
party was his negro, and he bought him,' 85 contrary to what Holt had said
emphatically in Chamberlaine. Justice Powell also noted that a man may
sell a captive and "he remains a captive to the vendee. '86 These rules were
much more favorable to slaveowners and permissive of slave transactions
than the ones in Chamberlaine and Browne and Cooper. The Gould rules
permitted English slaveowners to maintain indefinite economic control of
80. Baker, Introduction, 475.
81. The attorney general intervened, asserting that slaves were inheritances (i.e., realty)
by Virginia law and could be transferred only by deed, so no judgment was given, but that
does not affect the analysis of Holt's approach to pleading.
82. Smith v. Browne and Cooper.
83. Smith v. Gould, (1706) 2 Salk. 666, 91 E.R. 567; 2 Ld. Raym. 1274,92 E.R. 338, I.T.
Mitford MS 32 fo. 7, H.L.S. MS 1109(1), fo. 22. 1 thank James Oldham for copies of his
transcriptions of the Inner Temple (I.T.) and Harvard Law School (H.L.S.) MS reports.
84. Mitford MS; H.L.S. MS.
85. Smith v. Gould, 2 Salk. 666, 91 E.R. 567.
86. Mitford MS. Wiecek saw trespass as providing a means of asserting title to a slave.
Wiecek, "Somerset," 93.
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their slaves and were independent of any requirement to establish villein
status; yet they also rejected classical chattel slavery.
Legal opinion and events after Holt's decisions. In the early 1720s,
the Privy Council apparently adopted the position that the governing law
in a colony would depend on whether it was conquered or settled.8 7 This
determination meant that different colonies would have different common
laws; some would not follow English common law, often thought to be the
"birthright" of Englishmen.88 Moreover, the Privy Council decision also
created the risk that slavery might be unlawful in certain colonies under
the Holt decisions.
By 1729, responding to such uncertainties and religious pressures for
slave Christianization, 9 slaveowners felt the need to seek legal clarifica-
tion on key points relating to slavery, which they obtained in the 1729
Yorke-Talbot slavery "Opinion." 90 That Opinion-made by the Crown's
principal Law Officers at an Inn of Court-cited no authority, and pro-
vided no rationale. Yet it was written to be relied upon and was widely
published.9' In summary, the Opinion held that a slave's status did not
change when brought to England; that a slave could be compelled to return
to the colonies; and that slave baptism did not constitute manumission.
The Opinion's conclusion that slave status was neither "determined
nor varied" when a slave came to England, so that slaves were property
throughout the empire, was profoundly new "imperial" law. On that point,
the Opinion was completely at odds with the conclusions of commenta-
tors from Harrison and Molloy onward, as well as with the Holt decisions
87. Case 15-Anonymous, (1722) 2 P. Wins. 75, 24 E.R. 646. What law governed in the
colonies had been an issue since the late seventeenth century, particularly in the case of
Jamaica, which at one point asserted by statute that all English common law was in force in
Jamaica. See also APC Colonial (1720-1745), vol. 3, 47 (26 July) (Jamaica), and Joseph H.
Smith, Appeals to the Privy Councilfrom the American Plantations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1950), 482-83.
88. Loughton, Conquest and Settlement, 69-79. See also Bilder, Transatlantic Constitu-
tion, 35-46 and passim. But cf. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, "The Ancient Constitution and the
Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence," Law and History Review 21
(2003): 439-82 (arguing that English law did not confer English rights on colonies).
89. Edmund Gibson, Two Letters (London, 1727), 10-13; Edmund Gibson, Two Letters
(with an Address) (London, 1729), 10. Gibson was Bishop of London.
90. Philip Yorke later became Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, one of the most influential
judges of the eighteenth century, and was an important mentor to Lord Mansfield. The
Opinion was quoted in full in Knight v. Wedderburn, (1778) 8 Fac. Dec. 5, Mor. 14545
(Scot. Ct. Sess.).
91. David B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (1966; reprint, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988), 209-10; M. W. Jernegan, "Slavery and Conversion in the
Colonies," The American Historical Review 21, no. 3 (1916): 504-27, 507 n. 19.
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and even with Butts v. Penny, both regarding what law governed a slave's
status in England and what that status was.
The 1732 statute that classified colonial "Negroes" (slaves) as property
in debtor-creditor relations mandated uniform rules and remedies applicable
to slave property throughout the empire and could have been seen as the
commercial law analogue of the Opinion's conclusion that "imperial" slave
property had uniform status throughout the empire.9 2 A 1732 habeas corpus
proceeding, R. v. Cartor, involved a black woman alleged to be a slave,
but its facts suggest that the court did not consider the woman's status.93
In 1749, in Pearne v. Lisle,94 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke (formerly
Philip Yorke) wrote what amounted to a defense of his earlier Yorke-
Talbot Opinion in a decision granting a motion to discharge a writ of ne
exeat regno. Underlying Pearne was a dispute between an English resident,
Pearne, and Lisle, an Antigua resident temporarily in England, related to
fourteen slaves in Antigua.95
To show that Antigua law would grant full relief to the plaintiff, making
English litigation unnecessary and thus justifying discharge of the writ,
Hardwicke decided to prove, first, that English law would grant full relief,
and, second, that Antigua law-that is, colonial law on slavery-must
follow English law. Accordingly, Hardwicke needed to demonstrate first
that English law permitted slavery. This occasioned his defense of the
Yorke-Talbot Opinion.
The core of Hardwicke's defense was an attack on Holt's slavery posi-
tion that had fundamental implications for the relation between slavery
in England and slavery in the colonies: Holt had been wrong in stating
that coming to England automatically freed slaves, because, if accepted,
that principle would free all colonial slaves, since all colonies were ulti-
mately "subject to" English law9 6 (a quite remarkable conclusion in view
92. See Act, n. 54.
93. R v. Cartor, (1732) W Kel. 98, 25 E.R. 511, (as Anon) 2 Barn. 215, 94 E.R. 457, SC
R. v. Ann, a black, (1733) Eng. Leg. MS H 1778-150 f. 46 (MSF 25), H.L.S. MS 4055[3].
The woman was imprisoned for assaulting her master and sought bail. The alleged owner
offered to show that she was a slave, but the court refused to permit this. There are several
reasons why refusal might have occurred, including the owner's earlier failure to allege
slave status and the woman's apparent marriage to a freeman surety, so the case cannot be
read more broadly.
94. Pearne v. Lisle, (1749) Amb. 75, 27 E.R. 47.
95. Complaint of Robert Pearne, PRO Cl 1/1097/37.
96. Amb. 75, 27 E.R. 47. Davis argued that Hardwicke was relying on a statute of Wil-
liam III for his conclusion that Antigua law must follow English law, but there is no textual
support in Pearne for the view that Hardwicke's position depended on a particular statute,
as opposed to Hardwicke's "imperial Whig" view, shared with others, that English law was
supreme, and colonial law could not be repugnant to it on a fundamental issue like whether
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of Hardwicke's intimate familiarity with the conquest/settlement doctrine
stemming from his prior Crown legal service).97
Thus, England and the colonies necessarily followed one legal rule re-
garding slavery, which, in Hardwicke's view, was that it was lawful and
slaves were property in both places. Lord Mansfield was intimately familiar
with Pearne v. Lisle when he decided Somerset and, as discussed below,
it was precisely because of Pearne's imperial implications that it was the
major authority with which Mansfield grappled in making his decision.
Even had Pearne served only vigorously to reaffirm the earlier Yorke-
Talbot Opinion, reaffirmance would have given that Opinion added force
as precedent. Some lawyers prior to Somerset thought the 1729 Opinion
represented a definitive statement of the law on slavery in England.9
In Shanley v. Harvey (1762), Lord Northington LC held that any slave
who came to England was emancipated, was protected by habeas corpus
if unlawfully restrained, and, if a servant, had a right to sue for "ill usage"
by a master.9 9 Although counsel in Somerset brought Shanley to the court's
attention, it played no significant part in the decision.
R. v. Stapylton, the last slavery case prior to Somerset, involved the at-
tempted forcible deportation of an African slave, Thomas Lewis, by Stapyl-
ton, Lewis's purported owner.100 At the 1771 trial before Lord Mansfield,
Stapylton defended on the ground that because the slave was property, the
acts complained of were not criminal offenses.
In Stapylton, Lord Mansfield permitted extensive testimony by Lewis
regarding his life history as it related to Stapylton's alleged title. Mansfield
said that, if the jury found that Stapylton had a property interest in Lewis,
they should bring in a special verdict; if not, "you will find the Defendant
slaves were property. Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 170-71; P. J. Marshall, "Parlia-
ment and Property Rights in the Late Eighteenth Century," in Early Modern Conceptions of
Property, ed. John Brewer and Susan Staves (London: Routledge, 1995), 530-44, 531-32;
compare David B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823
(1975; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 507.
97. Hardwicke also argued that Holt had ignored or misconstrued the precedent created
by villeinage because slavery was no different than villeinage, which was lawful in Eng-
land, thus tacitly agreeing with Holt that English law would not permit classical chattel
slavery.
98. See above, n. 39, and 610.
99. Shanley v. Harvey, (1762) 2 Eden 126, 28 E.R. 844.
100. Granville Sharp procured Stapylton's indictment by a Middlesex grand jury for as-
sault and false imprisonment. Stapylton removed the case to the King's Bench. Accounts of
Stapylton include: Granville Sharp, Minutes of the trial of Thomas Lewis (N.Y. Historical
Society MS 1771) (hereafter Minutes) and Lord Mansfield's trial notes (Oldham, Mansfield
Manuscripts, 2:1242-43).
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Guilty."'' The jury found Stapylton guilty.0 2 After the jury verdict, Mans-
field steadfastly refused to permit sanctions against Stapylton. 03
During the trial, Lord Mansfield said he had granted "several" writs
of habeas corpus to deliver "negroes" to their masters based on property
claims. Thus, as late as 1771, it appears that Lord Mansfield continued to
incline to the view that slave property could legally exist in England. As
others have noted, Lord Mansfield stated in Stapylton that he would pre-
sume Lewis free unless the owner proved the contrary. Mansfield did not,
however, hold that a slave became free on coming to England. If Mansfield
had thought that the law emancipated a slave upon her coming to England,
he could have ruled Stapylton's evidence of title inadmissible.
Mansfield added, "whether they [masters] have this kind of property or
not in England has never been solemnly determined."'' 0 4 It appears quite
likely that by a "solemn determination" Lord Mansfield had in mind taking
a special verdict and hearing argument on this before the Twelve Judges,
a procedure used at that time for determining points of law in criminal
cases.105 No such solemn determination had ever occurred regarding slavery
in England. In Stapylton, Mansfield seems initially to have been willing
to create a process that could lead to such a determination.
However, beginning a pattern of marked ambivalence about how to
approach slavery, Lord Mansfield then sought to discourage both parties
from pursuing the issue. Mansfield said he would prefer not to see the
ultimate issue of slave property decided in England, which suggested a
strong desire to avoid the issue entirely. 06
Despite this, Mansfield went to greater lengths to raise questions about
the slaveowner's claim than earlier writers have suggested.0 7 Mansfield
credited most, if not all, of Lewis's testimony, not just his testimony on
the "chain of ownership" issue, and very clearly communicated his belief
in Lewis's credibility to the jury.0 8 It was predictable indeed that based
101. Minutes, 71.
102. Oldham, "New Light," 51.
103. Mansfield expressed concern about whether Lewis should have been permitted to
testify, but it is uncertain whether this concern was genuine.
104. Fiddes, "Sommersett Case," 503.
105. Baker, Introduction, 139, 522-23. The "Twelve Judges" was composed of the judges
of the three principal Crown courts: King's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas.
106. Oldham, "New Light," 48 (quoting Minutes as quoted in Hoare, Memoirs).
107. Oldham argued that Mansfield thought it was likely that the jury would find that
Stapylton had no property in the slave, Lewis, because Mansfield had indicated that there
had been a break in the "chain of ownership" of Lewis by Stapylton. Oldham, Mansfield
Manuscripts, 1: 1225-28.
108. Minutes, 72.
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on Mansfield's summing up the jury would find that Stapylton had "no
property" in Lewis. In addition, Mansfield tested Stapylton's title based
on his view of what English law required, sub silentio determining the
slave's status under English law.
Conclusions
The evidence from English social history is that black slaves brought to
England occupied a very subordinate servitude status as "slavish servants"
or "near slaves," not fully slave, but certainly not free. The ideological basis
of such "near slavery" was not "redemptive," but rested fundamentally on
the view that certain groups, including Africans, were properly enslaveable,
unlike Britons. The popular tradition positing slave emancipation on arrival
actually represented not a tradition of emancipation but instead appears to
have meant that the rights of slave property owners physically to punish
slaves brought to England were limited to punishment rights also exercis-
able over others in servitude in England. English "near slavery" shared
many characteristics with chattel slavery, but limited permissible physical
brutality toward slaves and may not have been heritable, thus resembling
English indentured servitude if one conceives of that status as including
an involuntary, alienable, perpetual form.
The law on slavery in England supported these social practices. The
views of the English courts on the status of slaves imported into England
during the centuries prior to Somerset contained broad areas of agreement,
despite differences about substantive issues such as whether an action of
trover could be brought for slaves. There was no support for the view that
classical chattel slavery could exist under English common law. Butts
and the Holt court's decisions rejected chattel slavery, but nevertheless
provided a powerful framework of economic claims available to masters
that legitimized and supported "near slavery" in England in the eighteenth
century, thus also rejecting full emancipation. Shanley v. Harvey was an
apparent late exception favoring actual emancipation, but not a histori-
cally important one. The courts rejected a slave's status under foreign (or
colonial) law as a basis for slavery in England and prohibited masters from
inflicting unlimited brutal punishment on slaves in England with impunity.
Such legally sanctioned "near slavery" existed in England through the time
of Somerset. The term "slave" was often used to describe what were in
actuality "slavish servants."
There were exceptions to this broad consensus in law and social practice,
but it is important to appreciate precisely their significance. The Yorke-
Talbot Opinion announced a uniform "imperial property" view of slavery.
Pearne v. Lisle held that slavery was lawful throughout the empire because
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it was lawful in England, thus sharply disagreeing with Holt's conclusion in
Smith v. Browne and Cooper that the common law of England on slavery,
and the laws of the colonies, were independent, so that England could reject
slavery while imposing it on the colonies. Blackstone initially supported
Holt's position. Thus, a sharp tension in English slavery law just prior to
Somerset concerned whether English and colonial slavery law were identi-
cal or independent, a tension that was at least as significant as the tension
regarding the precise legal contours of "near slavery" in England.
The social and legal struggles over the status of slaves who came to
England and the relationship of English and colonial law came to the
boiling point in Somerset, confronting Lord Mansfield with the potentially
politically divisive task of deciding on a transatlantic stage what the law
of the empire on those issues would be.
II. Somerset's Case: An Imperial Perspective
This part analyzes Lord Mansfield's judgment in Somerset's Case. It begins
by briefly explaining the facts, setting, and key arguments of counsel and
then considers the judgment. Was Lord Mansfield's decision intended fully
to emancipate slaves who came to England? This issue, the focus of much
of the earlier writing about the case, is one of several discussed here. °9
This part also considers further questions: If slaves were not emancipated
upon coming to England, what was their status after the decision? What
was the significance of Lord Mansfield's inclusion in the judgment of an
epigrammatic positive law ruling? It is argued here that Mansfield's posi-
tive law holding was motivated by both domestic and imperial political
considerations, but also reflected his personal beliefs. The part closes with
a discussion of Mansfield's intent regarding colonial slavery, arguing that
Mansfield knew and intended that his decision would have serious adverse
consequences for colonial slavery.
109. Fiddes, "Sommersett Case," 499-511; C. H. S. Fifoot, Lord Mansfield (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1936), 41-42; Jerome Nadelhaft, "The Somersett Case and Slavery:
Myth, Reality and Repercussions," Journal of Negro History 51 (1966): 193-208; Bauer,
"Law, Slavery," 96-146; Walvin, Black and White, 117-31; Wiecek, "Somerset"; Shyllon,
Black Slaves, 77-124; Davis, Slavery in Revolution, 469-522; Jack R. Pole, "Slavery and
Revolution: The Conscience of the Rich," The Historical Journal 20, no. 2 (1977): 503-13;
Higginbotham, Matter of Color, 313-55; Edmund Heward, Lord Mansfield (Chichester:
Barry Rose, 1979), 139-49; Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 37-49; Fryer, Staying
Power, 120-26; Oldham, "New Light," 45-68; Oldham, Mansfield Manuscripts, 1221-44;
Cotter, "Somerset," 31-56; Paley, "Mansfield, Slavery," 165-84.
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Factual Background and Setting
On the morning of November 28, 1771, a somewhat piqued Lord Mans-
field denied a renewed motion for judgment by plaintiff in the Stapylton
case. 10 Yet, later that same day, Lord Mansfield issued a writ of habeas
corpus to John Knowles, captain of the Ann and Mary, on which Somerset
was "confined in irons . . - ' " commanding that Knowles "immediately"
produce Somerset before Mansfield." 2
The return to the writ stated the following material points. 3 There were
"Negro slaves" in Africa,"4 and the slave trade with Africa was necessary
to supply slaves to the colonies.' 5 By colonial law, slaves were "saleable
and sold" in that trade as goods and chattels and when purchased were
"slaves" and saleable "property."" '6 Somerset was "a negro ... native of
Africa," brought to Virginia and sold to Charles Steuart. Steuart brought
Somerset to England on business." 7 Somerset escaped and refused to return
to Steuart's service.18
Somerset was a notorious "test" case. The hearings were widely reported
in English and colonial newspapers." 9 Counsel for Somerset served without
compensation. 2 ° The West Indian slaveholding interests controlled and
financed the defense,' 2' presumably because they believed their interests
would be damaged by a decision in favor of Somerset.
It would have been difficult to find a more capable group of counsel to
110. Minutes, 5-6; compare Hoare, Memoirs, 91-92 (June 1771). Court records support
the later date, PRO KB 21/40 (yet Thursday next fifteen days after the feast of Saint Martin
12 Geo. 1II), release of Stapylton's recognizances.
111. 20 S.T. 1-2.
112. The writ and return are in PRO KB 16/17/2.
113. Courts then were generally bound by the facts in the return. Robert J. Sharpe, The
Law of Habeas Corpus, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 23, 64.
114. 20 S.T. 8-9.
115. 20 S.T. 10-11.
116. 20 S.T. 11-14.
117.20 S.T. 21-22.
118.20 S.T. 22.
119. At least thirteen British newspapers-and twenty-two out of twenty-four North
American colonial newspapers sampled by Bradley-reported the arguments or decision.
Newspapers reviewed for this article included: London Evening Post; Gazetteer & New
Daily Advertiser; General Evening Post; Felix Farley's Bristol Journal; The London Packet;
The Middlesex Journal; The London Chronicle; London Gazette; The Public Advertiser;
The Morning Chronicle; The Edinburgh Advertiser; The Manchester Mercury; The Public
Ledger; The Williamsburg Virginia Gazette; and The Charleston South Carolina Gazette.
The arguments and decision were also reported in various widely circulated periodicals.
See Cotter, "Somerset," 32 n. 4 (citing Bradley).
120. Hoare, Memoirs, 124.
121. Wiecek, "Somerset," 102.
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argue Somerset. 122 Serjeant William Davy, justly renowned as a sharp-wit-
ted and tenacious cross-examiner willing to confront Mansfield if neces-
sary, opened and closed the arguments for Somerset. His co-counsel, the
"famous radical" Serjeant John Glynn, was a Member of Parliament for
Middlesex. James Mansfield (no relation to Lord Mansfield), another Som-
erset counsel, went on to become solicitor general and chief justice of the
Court of Common Pleas. Francis Hargrave, a junior counsel, volunteered
his services and made his reputation as a result. 23
Steuart's counsel were equally eminent. John Dunning had been solici-
tor general and was a Member of Parliament. He had been the prosecutor
for the slave in the Stapylton case. Lord Mansfield thought very highly of
Dunning, whom many regarded as the best lawyer of the day. James Wal-
lace, Dunning's co-counsel, later became solicitor and attorney general.
Mansfield's parliamentary role as administration spokesman had in pre-
vious years put him at odds with several of Somerset's counsel and with
Lord Camden, chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas, on important
legal issues, and on colonial policy in particular. In view of the strong
support shown by Somerset's politically active lawyers for his cause, and
the very substantial press and public discussion the case received, Lord
Mansfield must have been acutely aware of its political sensitivity. Indeed,
the Somerset arguments often amounted to political threats or persuasion in
addition to (sometimes even in lieu of) more traditional legal argument.
Arguments of Counsel
During five days of hearings, Somerset's counsel made virtually every
conceivable argument against the legality of slavery in England. Somerset's
counsel also bluntly and in graphic terms made clear their abhorrence for
colonial slavery and the slave trade, presenting a range of further argu-
ments that would have challenged the legality of both institutions. They
argued that slavery was contrary to natural law, and that there was no
right of permanent enslavement. They argued that slavery was inconsistent
with Christianity and also inconsistent with inherent limits on the right
to contract.
In response, counsel for Steuart, the real party defendant, argued that
English law authorized contemporary slavery in England because villein-
age, its equivalent, was still legally permissible. They argued that English
statutes authorized slavery not just in the colonies but in England. Alter-
122. The brief sketches here are taken from the Dictionary of National Biography.
123. The other Somerset counsel, Mr. Allen or Alleyne, appears to have been a young
West Indian about whom little else is known. Bauer, "Law, Slavery," 99 n. 10.
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natively, they argued, slaves who came to England should be treated as
servants while their masters were temporarily in England, but their return
to the colonies should nevertheless be compellable. Finally, they argued,
subtly but forcefully, that a decision emancipating slaves who came to
England would endanger colonial slavery. A review of core arguments
made by the adversaries is useful in understanding the judgment. 2 4
Somerset's counsel's core arguments. Serjeant Davy began by attacking
villeinage as a tyrannical "usurpation upon.., natural rights,"'25 which had
become extinct for compelling secular and religious reasons, 2 6 and which,
even if legally still valid, could not apply to Somerset and would, in any
event, be politically unacceptable as a basis for slavery.'27 Davy made an
extended, politically very pointed, argument that the rival Court of Com-
mon Pleas, which could also hear slavery cases if Mansfield decided for the
slaveowners, would never accept villeinage as a legal basis for slavery.
Davy contended that setting foot in England emancipated slaves:,2"
"[A]ny slave being once in England, the very air made him a free man,"
citing Cartwright's Case, 2 9 because ". . . the Soil the Air of England...
makes this part of our Constitution."' 30 Davy asserted that Virginia law
could not apply in England. England would not permit "a Turk" to "bring
here his fair Circasian slaves" and rape them with impunity.' 3' Virginia
law would permit Steuart to beat Somerset to death with impunity, or cut
off part of Somerset's foot for trying to escape. 3 2 Since such acts would
124. Arguments of counsel from the following sources, which are either primary or contain
primary materials, were used here: Hoare, Memoirs, 103-33; Granville Sharp, Proceedings
Feb. 7, 1772, in the court of the King's Bench, London, before Chief Justice Mansfield, part
of the case of James Sommersett, a slave belonging to Charles Stewart (N.Y. Historical
Society MS 1772) (hereafter Proceedings); newspapers (see above, n. 119); Henry Marchant,
Diary (R.I. Historical Society MS 1771-2) (citations are to the typed transcript, Philadelphia
Historical Society); Lincoln's Inn MS Dampier, Ashhurst Paper Books (hereafter cited
as "APB"), 10b; and the Lofft and S.T. reports. I thank Michael Macnair for bringing to
my attention the existence of the Marchant diary. Detailed discussions of the hearings are
found in: Bauer, "Law, Slavery," 96-146; Shyllon, Black Slaves, 77-124; Davis, Slavery
in Revolution, 469-522; Higginbotham, Matter of Color, 336-48.
125. Proceedings, 13.
126. Proceedings, 27-28. Davy said that for Somerset he would give up the position that
baptism constituted manumission, an important concession. Ibid., 74. Somerset had been
baptized. Paley, "Mansfield, Slavery," 169.
127. Proceedings, 34-35.
128. Marchant, Diary, 1:119.
129. General Evening Post (London) (hereafter Post), 6-8 February 1772, 3; Marchant,
Diary, 1:119.
130. Marchant, Diary, 1: 120.
131. Ibid.
132. Proceedings, 68; Marchant, Diary, 1: 120.
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be crimes in England, Somerset's slave status in Virginia must be disre-
garded in England.'33 Finally, Davy discussed a number of precedents he
claimed barred English slavery, among which were virtually all of the
cases discussed above in Part I.
Serjeant Glynn then argued "very strongly" for Somerset.'34 Glynn im-
mediately made clear his political focus by stating that he was certain the
court would not be influenced by "any undue influence" from the slave
colonies or their "convenience" in deciding the case.'35 Glynn asserted that
slavery was dangerously expansive and dehumanizing.'36 Villeinage was
so disfavored legally that any other species of slavery would have to have
been authorized by statute.'37
After listening to Davy and Glynn, Henry Marchant, a prominent Ameri-
can attorney, wrote in his diary for that day that there was no difference in
principle between profiting from the slave trade and employing slaves in a
business. In Marchant's view, the argument that "British soil and British
air" were different from American "Soil and Air" where "Liberty" was
concerned was nothing more than a "plausible Pretence" to "cheat an hon-
est American of his slave."'38 Marchant thought that Davy's and Glynn's
arguments attacking slavery in England would apply with equal force to
the colonies.' 39
James Mansfield made a natural rights argument, 40 and concluded that
slavery in England could only be imposed by "the legislature.' 4 ' Francis
Hargrave followed. His primary argument was that the procedures for
establishing villeinage were exclusive, and therefore slavery could not
now be established in England, "until the legislature shall interpose its
authority.... ,,42 Hargrave also asserted that colonial slavery rested only
on positive law. Mr. Allen, final Somerset counsel, made a broad-ranging
attack on the theoretical basis of slavery itself, an argument that would
have outlawed colonial as well as English slavery.
43
133. Marchant, Diary, 1:120.
134. Post, 3.
135. Proceedings, 98.
136. Ibid., 108.
137. Ibid., 102.
138. Marchant, Diary, 1: 123.
139. Ibid.
140. Bauer, "Law, Slavery," 105; Hoare, Memoirs, 125-26. Davis's magisterial treatment
on one occasion attributes to Lord Mansfield remarks that James Mansfield (see above,
626) made. Davis, Slavery in Revolution, 497; compare London Evening Post, 9-12 May
1772, 4.
141. Hoare, Memoirs, 126.
142. 20 S.T. 48.
143. 20 S.T. 68.
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Steuart's counsel's main arguments. In addition to the arguments sum-
marized above, Wallace attacked the precedents on which Somerset's
counsel had relied. He also argued-acknowledging the importance of
the chronic runaway problem facing slaveowners-that if change of loca-
tion were sufficient to change slave status, a slave who left Virginia to go
"to the adjacent country" would be freed.'"
Dunning's argument (quite probably approved by the slaveowners)
took a very different tack from-and, indeed, undercut-Wallace's ar-
gument. Dunning emphasized that he did not intend to defend slavery
per se. Instead, he subtly conveyed to Mansfield the slaveowners' core
concern-which was not whether they won in Somerset, but rather, the
precise grounds on which it was decided. Dunning did this by presenting
an extended discussion of the economic value of slaves in Jamaica'45 and
the dangerous effects a decision emancipating slaves in England would
have on future insurrections there. This entire discussion was wholly ir-
relevant, as Dunning surely knew, unless the decision in Somerset would
adversely affect colonial slavery. Dunning stated that he thought the same
numbers of "negroes" would come to England no matter how Somerset
was decided, thus making clear to Mansfield that slaveowner interests did
not care fundamentally about the substantive outcome in Somerset itself.
Dunning's arguments demonstrate that the actual concern of the slave-
owners was not primarily to prevail in Somerset, which they saw as mar-
ginal to their interests, but was instead to prevent a ruling in Somerset
that had much broader adverse implications for them. Although Dunning
framed the possible adverse effects in terms of colonial slave rebellions,
a legitimate enough concern to avoid the charge that it was pure pre-
text, contemporary evidence shows that slaveowners were in reality very
concerned that a ruling that slaves were not property in England would
necessarily devalue or destabilize their colonial investments in what they
thought was a risky trade. 146
144. 20 S.T. 70.
145. Using Dunning's figures, about 580 million Great Britain pounds or $1 billion in
today's purchasing power.
146. Post, 28 May 1772 (West Indians have "obtained a promise from Mr. Steuart not
to accommodate the Negro cause, but to have the point solemnly determined; since, if the
laws of England do not confirm the colony laws with respect to property in slaves, no man
of common sense will, for the future, lay out his money in so precarious a commodity. The
consequences of which will be inevitable ruin to the British West-Indies. The price of slaves
is, we hear, already greatly enhanced on account of the Negro question; and people say
that, 'till it is finally decided, the African trade will be in a manner annihilated.')(emphasis
added). On slave rebellions in the West Indies, several of which had occurred in Jamaica
in the early to mid-1760s, see O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 36-40.
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Dunning conceded that Cartwright's Case meant that when a slave was
brought from Russia, the master could no longer punish him according
to the slave laws of Russia.'47 However, Dunning argued, English law
recognized a right to hold persons to involuntary lifetime service subject
to limits on "cruel usage," and that was all that slaveowners sought. Dun-
ning thus offered Mansfield a basis for sustaining Steuart's position far
narrower than that suggested by Wallace. Even more importantly, Dunning
had made clear that the slaveowners wanted to avoid losing the case on
the broad grounds advocated by Somerset's counsel.
Posthearing Proceedings and Legislative Efforts
At the close of argument, Lord Mansfield announced that "though his
brothers on the Bench should be unanimous, [the case] required ... [a]
consultation ... among the twelve Judges .... "'4 8 According to Justice
Ashhurst's notes, Mansfield said he thought that the "return renounce[d]"
the idea of a "contract of service" because the owner insisted on the power
to use force to send Somerset abroad for sale;'49 this claim meant "every
idea of [such] a contract ceases ..... "50 Mansfield continued that complete
liberty for English slaves would cost owners 700,000 pounds,'5 ' while if
colony slave laws "be found binding ... it must imply consequences al-
together foreign" (i.e., unacceptable).' Mansfield listed as unacceptable
consequences the power of killing slaves or enslaving their posterity. 53
Mansfield then explained that Steuart and the West India merchants could
end the matter by manumitting Somerset; and that if the merchants chose
to go through with the case, "judgement should be given according to the
strict letter of the law ... without ... power to attend to ... compassion
.. or the danger of the precedent... fiatjustitia ruat coelum .... ,,t54
The parties did not compromise, apparently because the slaveowners
decided that they wanted a definitive legal ruling to resolve the uncer-
tainty regarding their colonial property interests.'55 Slaveowner interests
147. APB, 10b.
148. London Evening Post, 21-23 May 1772, 4; Gazeteer and New Daily Advertiser, 26
May 1772, 4.
149. APB, 10 b.
150. Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 4.
151. In today's purchasing power, approximately 50 million Great Britain pounds or $90
million.
152. Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 4.
153. APB, 10b.
154. London Evening Post, 21-23 May 1772, 4.
155. See above, n. 146.
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nevertheless made an unsuccessful effort to obtain favorable legislation
days after Mansfield's remarks.' 56 Why Parliament declined to assist the
slaveowners is unknown, but it is clear that by 1772 there was substantial
English antislavery sentiment, at least in London, as evidenced by the
vigorous presentation by Somerset's politically active counsel, and by
the newspaper coverage of Somerset (which included related antislavery
editorials, antislavery commentary, and correspondence).'5 7 As early as
1776, Parliament also refused to act on motions by abolitionists attacking
the slave trade. It thus seems likely that in 1772 Parliament was already
internally divided on slavery and that the administration, which usually
had power to determine the parliamentary agenda, saw no useful politi-
cal purpose to be served by a debate that would force Parliament to take
sides on the issue, causing divisiveness not only over slavery but also over
whether there should be two laws of slavery, one for England and one for
the colonies, without colonial consent.
What is clear is that the slaveowners thought a court decision in Somerset
was necessary to protect the stability of investments in colonial property.' 58
A newly discovered newspaper report stated that slaveowners believed
that they would "certainly" win if the issue was decided by the Twelve
Judges, because the judges would conclude that colonial property created
by virtue of English statute must be deemed property in England. 5 9 For
that reason, the slaveowners may not have pressed Parliament particularly
hard to assist them. 60
The Content of Lord Mansfield's Judgment
On June 22, 1772, Lord Mansfield delivered his Somerset judgment. Sub-
sequently, there has been considerable disagreement about what he actually
156. Journal of the House of Commons XXXIII 789 (25 May 1772); Morning Chronicle,
26 May 1772, 2. The slaveowners' motion suffered a type of procedural defeat that was a
common Parliamentary tactic for avoidance of controversial issues; the agenda then contained
no urgent business.
157. Langford noted that there had been a sharp growth of abolitionist sentiment among
prominent Englishmen and in many colonies by the 1770s. Langford, A Polite and Com-
mercial People, 517.
158. See above, n. 146.
159. Manchester Mercury, 2 June 1772, 1.
160. Fiddes, "Sommersett Case," 508-9 (slaveholders' Parliamentary efforts were not
vigorous; assigns no reason). The West Indian lobby had limited, albeit substantial, power
in Parliament and had other pressing issues that concerned its members. O'Shaughnessy,
An Empire Divided.
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said.' 6 1 Oldham compared five versions of Lord Mansfield's judgment. 162
Other versions of the judgment are found in approximately a dozen news-
papers published at the time. 63 These other versions may be divided into
the "brief reports" and the "detailed" newspaper report. Although the brief
reports addressed important issues, and appear generally consistent with
Mansfield's known views, given the possibility of bias, hearsay, confusion,
and lack of corroboration, it seems best to exclude them from consideration
in analyzing the judgment. 6 4
The "detailed" report. The brief reports were quickly followed-in
some newspapers-by a detailed account of Lord Mansfield's judgment
that agreed in most respects with the Hill/Balguy report.'65 This contem-
poraneous newspaper report is probably the most accurate account of
the judgment, not the considerably later Hill/Balguy report preferred by
Oldham. 166 There were significant differences between the accounts. 67
161. Several newspaper sources say the judgment was written, but no manuscript has
been located.
162. Oldham, "New Light," 54-60. The reports were: Lofft 1; The Scots Magazine, vol 34,
297 (June 1772); Sharp Judgement (N.Y. Historical Society MS 1772); Ashhurst, LI Dampier
MSS APB 10b; Hill MS 10, J. H. Baker, English Legal Manuscripts, 2:81 (H 1787-A87),
MSF 92, f. 312-314. The Hill MS was a report copied from notebooks of John Balguy, a
junior barrister who later became a Welsh judge. J. Bruce Williamson, The Middle Temple
Bench Book, 2d ed. (London 1937), 198 (I thank Guy Holborn of Lincoln's Inn Library
for this reference). Based on notations in Hill's notebook, which also identified Balguy as
the report's author (hereafter Hill[Balguy report), it is unlikely that Hill copied the report
before 1774; there is no indication that Hill compared it to other reports.
163. These included at least the newspapers listed above, n. 119.
164. The brief reports. Some newspapers reported that Lord Mansfield had indeed freed
slaves who came to England, but subject to an important limitation: "Lord Mansfield...
said, that every Slave brought into this Country ought to be free, and that no Master had a
Right to sell them here ... but he declared that the Owner might bring an Action of Trover
against any one who shall take the Black into his service." Manchester Mercury, 30 June
1772, 1. Other newspapers carried a shortened, materially different version of that report.
Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 27 June 1772, 2. Yet other newspapers initially reported
a much narrower decision by Lord Mansfield, "that [the] master had no power to compel
him on board a ship, or to send him back to the plantations." Post, 20-23 June 1772, 3;
Daily Advertiser, 23 June 1772, 1. Other newspapers combined this description of a narrow
holding with a statement that the judgment provided'a trover action for owners. London
Evening Post, 20-23 June 1772, 3. Another report stated: "Lord Mansfield... delivered the
unanimous opinion ... that the man's being a Negro Slave, did not authorize his Master to
transport him out of the kingdom ... " London Chronicle, 20-23 June 1772, 6.
165. London Evening Post, 23-25 June 1772, 1; Post, 21-23 June 1772, 4; Edinburgh
Advertiser, 30 June-3 July 1772, 1-2. An identical report appeared in The Scots Magazine
vol. 34 (June 1772), 298-99. See Appendix I of this article (online version only) for a
transcript of this report.
166. Davis's account of Somerset also relied on this newspaper report, although he referred
to it as the Scots Magazine report; the two are identical. Davis, Slavery in Revolution. The
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However, except as to whether Mansfield referred to the limited powers
of "courts of justice" regarding slavery, the differences between these
reports do not materially affect the major points made below regarding
the judgment.
Analysis of Lord Mansfield's Judgment
Lord Mansfield's Somerset judgment managed to be both delphic and
oracular, a rare feat. To avoid controversy, Mansfield provided as little
insight as possible into his thoughts.168 His brief statement of a compro-
newpaper/Scots Magazine report is preferable for several reasons: (i) had Lord Mansfield
regarded the report as inaccurate, he could easily have had it revised; (ii) if it had been
materially inaccurate someone probably would have attacked it, which did not occur; (iii)
the report is corroborated in several respects by Justice Ashhurst's notes; (iv) the Barbados
London agent and attorney Samuel Estwick accepted this report as a reasonably accurate
account of Lord Mansfield's decision even in the 1773 second edition of a pamphlet he
wrote attacking the decision. Samuel Estwick, Considerations on the Negroe Cause Com-
monly So Called, 2d ed. (London, 1773). It has been suggested that Estwick would have
preferred the newspaper report, but in view of the slaveowners' views on the necessity of
judicial relief and Estwick's attack on the decision, this seems unlikely. More important, it
seems fairly unlikely that Estwick would have relied on any report known to be inaccurate
by the time his attack's second edition appeared, since to have done so would have dam-
aged his credibility, and opposing pamphleteers like Francis Hargrave would have been
quick to point this out; (v) the newspaper report was consistent with Mansfield's views in
various cases discussed below.
167. The detailed newspaper report and the Hill/Balguy report disagreed on whether,
as the newspaper reported, Mansfield stated that "courts of justice" could not introduce
slavery now on "mere reasoning from any principles natural or political," or whether, as
the Hill/Balguy report says, he instead stated his conclusion that slavery could not ever be
based on such "natural or political" principles but could instead only be based on positive
law. The better view, as discussed below (641-42), is that the judgment did refer to the
limited powers of courts of justice.
Mansfield also said that because slavery was an "odious" condition, "it" or "immemo-
rial usage" regarding it, depending on the account, must be "taken" or "construed" strictly.
Mansfield meant that any alleged immemorial usage supporting slavery must meet stringent
criteria (not met by contemporary slavery) to be deemed valid. Mansfield may also have
meant that immemorial usage or positive law must clearly authorize any treatment of a person
as only a chattel slave could be treated before such treatment would be deemed lawful.
Mansfield then concluded that under English law, a master had never been permitted to
"take a slave [servant] by force to be sold abroad." The word "servant" appears at this point
in the Hill/Balguy MS; "slave" appears in the detailed newspaper account. The "detailed"
newspaper report is correct here. Mansfield used the term "slave" again later in explain-
ing Somerset, see R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton, (1785) 4 Doug. 300, 99 E.R. 891,
Lincoln's Inn MS Misc. 131 (Abbot) f. 135, H 1787-C 124 (MSF 113) f. 135, Middle Temple
MS Gibbs, Cases in King's Bench 24 & 25 Geo. 3 f. 240 (Abbot MS).
168. Contrast e.g. Raynard v. Chase, (1756) 1 Burr. 2, 97 E.R. 155 (brewery investment
challenged as unlawful). The judgment is analyzed using the "detailed" newspaper report
(see n. 165), except as noted.
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mise result accompanied by a statement of much broader principles led to
foreseeable controversy and misinterpretation on important points. Yet,
certain aspects of Mansfield's judgment deliberately set forth a clear and
powerful framework for the law of slavery in the empire.
The ruling outlawing private use offorce. The ruling in Somerset, Mans-
field himself later said, "only determined that a Master cannot by force car-
ry his Slave out of England .... "169 This was a technically correct account
of the narrow holding, particularly where emancipation was concerned,
but it was not a complete account of the effect of the judgment for several
reasons. First, Lord Mansfield held that all aspects of Somerset's status as
a servant must be determined under English law. Mansfield decided that
point completely consistently with the decisions in Chamberlaine, Smith v.
Gould, and, broadly speaking, even with Butts v. Penny. Second, although
in context Lord Mansfield's reference to a "high act of dominion" was a
reference not to all aspects of slavery but, instead, only to the use of force
to compel someone to leave England, 7 ' his ruling implied that whatever
a person's status outside England, any use of force against that person in
England must be permissible under English law. In these two significant
respects, the Yorke-Talbot Opinion was clearly contradicted, and Somerset
was inconsistent with Pearne v. Lisle. 1
7
'
If these points were all that Somerset had decided, it could fairly be
seen as an unremarkable continuation of the basic principle established by
earlier slavery cases that where conflicts of law occurred, England would
not impose on persons in England a penal status based on foreign law.
72
Given earlier law and Mansfield's views on conflict of laws issues, there
was no realistic possibility that Lord Mansfield would hold that Somerset's
status in Virginia permitted him to be subjected in England to physical
punishment or coercion that would be criminal under English law. In this
169. R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton, (quotation in Abbot MS report) (emphasis added).
See Appendix 2 of this article (online version only) for a transcription of the Abbot MS
report.
170. This was Davis's position, Davis, Slavery in Revolution, 498, and is very consistent
with Mansfield's comments throughout Somerset distinguishing between issues raised by
the use of force and those raised by other aspects of servitude.
171. There is no substantial evidence that Lord Mansfield's judgment discussed any
specific legal authority other than the Yorke-Talbot Opinion and Pearne v. Lisle, a telling
omission.
172. Chamberlaine, Smith v. Gould, and Somerset are cited as the principal support for
this proposition in a classic conflict of laws text. A.V. Dicey and J. H. C. Carlile, Dicey and
Morris on the Conflict of Laws, ed. L. A. Collins, 13th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
2000), 85 n. 42.
Somerset's Case
important respect, the outcome in Somerset was reasonably predictable,
contrary to the conclusions of Holdsworth and Oldham.'
Lord Mansfield did not state explicitly that he disagreed with the Yorke-
Talbot Opinion and Pearne v. Lisle only to the extent that they would per-
mit the use of force against a slave where English law would not permit its
use against other types of involuntary servants. Yet it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that that was Mansfield's view. If Mansfield had wanted to
disagree with Yorke-Talbot's conclusion that coming to England did not
emancipate slaves or with Pearne v. Lisle regarding trover, all he had to
do was to say so. 7 ' Still, his silence on the limited extent to which he was
rejecting these earlier opinions caused confusion. Even slaveowner attor-
neys such as Samuel Estwick were uncertain whether Mansfield intended
only limited rejection of the Yorke-Talbot Opinion. 75
Mansfield's unwillingness to state that slaves who came to England were
thereby emancipated was especially telling in view of the fact that this was
the central contention in Serjeant Davy's and Hargraves's arguments. Alter-
natively, Mansfield could have endorsed emancipation by adopting either a
broad reading of Chief Justice Holt's position in Chamberlaine and Smith v.
Gould'7 6 or by accepting Lord Northington LC's ruling in Shanley v. Har-
vey. 77 Instead, Mansfield entirely ignored both Somerset's counsel's con-
tentions and their authority, strong circumstantial evidence that he did not
intend his ruling to emancipate slaves in England.'78 Moreover, Mansfield
could not have emancipated English slaves without, in his view, exposing
English masters to property loss, claims for back wages, and possibly to
other types of tort claims as well, and he thought this type of retrospective
impact would be unacceptable. 79 Although other evidence seems unneces-
sary, Mansfield's private 1779 comments to Thomas Hutchinson, and a
newly discovered report (the Abbot MS report) of his comments regarding
the breadth of the Somerset decision in R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton
in 1785, both confirm his intent on emancipation. 80
173. Each expressed the view that Somerset could have gone either way. Holdsworth, His-
tory, 3:507-8; Oldham, Mansfield Manuscripts, 1:1240 ("outcome was not inexorable").
174. That Lord Chancellor Hardwicke had been Mansfield's mentor does not alter this
conclusion.
175. Estwick, Considerations, xii-xiii.
176. See above, 616, 618.
177. See above, 621.
178. Several writers relied on later events to explain intent, e.g., Fiddes, "Sommersett
Case"; Cotter, "Somerset"; Paley, "Mansfield, Slavery."
179. Mansfield had expressed general concern on this point as early as Stapylton. Hoare,
Memoirs, 91.
180. Thomas Hutchinson, The Diary and Letters of His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson,
Esq. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1884-86), 2:277; R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton.
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Mansfield's Thames Ditton comments leave no doubt that he did not
think that Somerset emancipated English slaves. In fact, the newly discov-
ered manuscript report of Thames Ditton makes clear that it was generally
accepted that Somerset had not emancipated English slaves; counsel for
both parties accepted that the pauper there was either a slave or in invol-
untary servitude once in England. 8 ' This new report also makes clear that
Mansfield believed that the ruling in Somerset turned on the fact that even
villeins could not be compelled to leave England; thus, it appears possible
that he thought the permissible treatment of English "slaves" was bounded
by the authorized treatment of villeins.
Mansfield's decision to prohibit any use of force against slaves who
came to England unless it was authorized by the common law meant that
he had barred classical chattel slavery in England (absent positive law),
despite his failure to emancipate slaves entirely. Mansfield's decision on
this point also had broader implications. The first was that it would become
more difficult legally to justify differences between treatment of slaves
and other servants-for example, would a slave sale not be a "high act
of dominion?" The second stemmed from the fact that Serjeant Davy had
based the claim for emancipation on the idea that anyone who came to
England had a right to equal benefit of the laws. 8 '
Remarkably, Mansfield's decision adopted the "rights of man" principle
that English common law provided certain minimum levels of substantive
protection to anyone who came to England (though the decision limited
the amount of substantive protection). This represented the emergence of
a new English concept of legal freedom that divorced fundamental legal
rights from race, birth, or free/servile status and based them instead on an
individual's status as political subject. Mansfield's position on this point
arguably transformed the concept of how English legal rights arose when
compared to the classic account in Calvin's Case. 183
The status of slaves brought to England. Mansfield's judgment was
also deliberately silent regarding the legal status of slaves in England
after Somerset. The better inference from Mansfield's unwillingness to
declare them emancipated, in light of both prior law and the arguments of
181. R. v. Inhabitants of Thames Ditton, (Abbot MS report).
182. Post, 6-8 February 1772, 3; Marchant, Diary, 1:119.
183. Calvin's Case, (1608) 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 E.R. 377, 2 S.T. 559. I am indebted to
Kim's excellent study on citizenship here. Keechang Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law: The
Origins of Modern Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 176-211.
Calvin's Case held that someone born in Scotland after the accession of James I to the
English throne would not be disqualified from holding property in England, because the
Scot had been born into the allegiance of the English king. As infidel aliens, African slaves
would not have benefited from Calvin's Case.
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counsel, is that he intended that a slave continue in "near slavery" once in
England.'84 This view of Mansfield's position is consistent with his later
statement in Thames Ditton that Somerset turned on the limits of power
over villeins under English law. This outcome was reasonably predictable.
"Near slavery" was the status of slaves who came to England established by
the predominant view in the law prior to Somerset, which did not require
a choice between slavery and full emancipation.
Nevertheless, it was also foreseeable that the public might conclude that
in deciding that slavery must be established by positive law, Mansfield was
also ending involuntary servitude or "near slavery" for slaves who came
to England. Mansfield's judgment did nothing to avoid misunderstanding.
Slaveowner attorneys were uncertain enough about Mansfield's intent on
this point that some chose to argue that nothing had been decided.'85 As the
next section shows, the inference is inescapable that Lord Mansfield's si-
lence on emancipation and the status of slaves was his deliberate choice.
Public confusion about the judgment. Most recent historians have con-
cluded that Lord Mansfield intended the substantive ruling in Somerset
to be limited to a ruling on the use of force and that he did not intend
emancipation.'8 6 That conclusion requires them to explain why much of
the public-and many later observers-thought the decision was much
broader in purpose or effect. A variety of explanations, from bad or biased
reporting of the decision by newspapers or Capel Lofft, to unduly broad
arguments by counsel, to propaganda regarding the decision spread by
interested parties, or Lord Mansfield's lack of foresight, have been offered
for this public perception. 8 7 These explanations are flawed.
The quality of the newspaper reporting of Somerset was generally quite
high. While there may have been some mistaken reporting or political bias,
what appear to be substantially accurate reports of the arguments and judg-
ment itself were quickly and widely circulated. Similarly, the arguments of
counsel were broad because they needed to be, given the issue raised by the
return to the writ, and because the court understandably permitted this.
The elimination of earlier explanations for the distortion in public per-
ception regarding the judgment leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the
distortion actually occurred primarily because Lord Mansfield, after six
184. Davis concluded similarly that English law (including Somerset) "did not totally dis-
solve the pre-existing relationship between master and slave." Davis, Slavery in Revolution,
498 and n. 52. But cf. Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 37-38.
185. Estwick, Considerations, 46.
186. Oldham, "New Light," 45. The prominent exception is Cotter, "Somerset."
187. Nadelhaft, "The Somersett Case," 199-201; Walvin, Black and White, 125; Paley,
"Mansfield, Slavery," 181-84; Fiddes, "Sommersett Case," 508; Wiecek, "Somerset,"
108.
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months of deliberation, intentionally issued a compromise judgment that
contained principles with potentially broad application and was silent on
emancipation and on the status of slaves after they came to England.'
88
Not only is it unquestionable that Mansfield was far too capable to have
remained silent on these points through inadvertence or lack of foresight,
Mansfield had told the parties in Stapylton that he believed such uncertainty
about the status of slaves was desirable. 9
As Mansfield must have known, his decision allowed the adversaries to
read it the way they wanted to read it on emancipation, and they proceeded
to do just that. Since the decision gave both sides what they most wanted
from it, it was unlikely to be challenged, and this met Mansfield's immediate
political goal. It is a strong inference from the political circumstances and
from the structure of the decision itself that Lord Mansfield accepted that his
judgment would be misinterpreted on emancipation and slave status as the
necessary price of political peace on slavery in England. Having accepted
that price, Mansfield was not about to articulate his reasoning publicly or
to resolve the uncertainty on these points once controversy began.
The positive law holding. Unlike his position on emancipation, the gist
of Lord Mansfield's positive law holding was unmistakably clear: slavery
in every country had always originated from positive law, by which Mans-
field meant either statute or its equivalent, immemorial usage or custom.
The first point to notice about this holding is that it deliberately applied
both to England and to its colonies, a breadth of application that was en-
tirely unnecessary to Mansfield's decision if the decision applied only to
slavery in England. The second point to observe is that Mansfield adopted
the position advocated by Somerset's counsel, both for England and for
the colonies.
Mansfield's positive law holding necessarily rejected the argument that
villeinage could provide a legal basis for English (or colonial) chattel slav-
ery. Mansfield's holding also necessarily rejected the argument that English
statutes passed in support of the slave trade, or those governing slavery in
the colonies, authorized slavery in England. Thus, Mansfield demolished
both major arguments supporting English chattel slavery advanced by the
West Indian slaveowners. But the ruling had much larger significance for
imperial politics and slavery.
If positive law was required to support English slavery, and there was, as
Mansfield thought, no such positive law, then chattel slavery was unlawful
188. Drescher agreed that Mansfield sought and deliberately maintained ambiguity about
his position, though his reasoning was somewhat different. Drescher, Capitalism and An-
tislavery, 40-4 1.
189. Fiddes, "Sommersett Case," 503-4.
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in England. This apparent equivalence between a requirement of "positive
law" to support slavery and a common law prohibition on slavery, the latter
the "first tier" position advocated by Somerset's counsel, raises a central
question about Lord Mansfield's judgment: why did Mansfield decline to
state explicitly that English common law barred chattel slavery?
To put this another way, did Lord Mansfield think the legal effect in
England and the colonies of the positive law holding was legally or politi-
cally the same as a holding that the common law of England prohibited
slavery? There is strong though circumstantial evidence that Mansfield
thought there were fundamental substantive and procedural differences
between the two conclusions. But Lord Mansfield chose not to explain
these differences.
The most persuasive evidence that Lord Mansfield did not think the "no
positive law" and "common law prohibition" conclusions were equivalent
is that if he had thought that they were equivalent, he could simply have
endorsed the arguments made by Somerset's counsel on this point. He
did not take this obvious course. To understand why, the critical clue is
Mansfield's deliberately expansive statement that his positive law conclu-
sion applied everywhere, not just to England, when he could easily have
limited his conclusion to English law.
The main reason that Lord Mansfield chose not to declare that English
common law prohibited chattel slavery was that to have done so would
have confronted him with two equally unpalatable choices. Either, as
Lord Hardwicke had reasoned in Pearne v. Lisle, Mansfield would also
have outlawed slavery in at least part, if not all, of the British colonies,
or Mansfield would have been forced to confirm Blackstone's position
that there were two systems of law where slavery was concerned, one
for England under the common law and one for the colonies that were
governed "outside" that law as conquests. Either result would have been
politically divisive, if not wholly unacceptable, in 1772, since one result
would have politically threatened colonial slaveowners whose allegiance
Britain wanted while the other would have offended both English and
colonial opponents not just of slavery but of Crown American policy. The
following considerations reinforce the conclusion that Mansfield decided
to avoid this divisive issue. 90
As is apparent from the stance of the parties, the arguments of counsel,
and the newspaper coverage, both sides in Somerset were well aware that
190. The imperial political significance of the West Indies is made clear by the fact that
during the 1760s and 1770s, "British colonial policy increasingly discriminated against the
North American colonies in favor of the British West Indies." O'Shaughnessy, An Empire
Divided, 106.
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Mansfield's decision could threaten the legality and stability of slavery
in the colonies as well as in England. For example, Serjeant Davy's argu-
ment that the "soil and air" of England conferred freedom, if confirmed
by Mansfield, would surely have been an argument that many thought
applicable to any country inhabited by Englishmen, or at least to any
English settlement, since it really referred to fundamental principles of
English law, which many thought, rightly or wrongly, were the "birthright"
of Englishmen and traveled with them. 9 ' Given Lord Mansfield's long
experience with conflicts between English and colonial law, which began
well prior to his accession to the bench and of which he made a classic
"restatement" only two years later in Campbell v. Hall, he would certainly
have understood Lord Hardwicke's position in Pearne that the colonies
must follow English law on a fundamental issue like slavery. Thus, he
would have understood the imperial implications of Davy's argument and
others like it attacking the foundations of slavery in every part of the em-
pire."' Mansfield would also have been acutely aware of the unpopularity
of Blackstone's position, which had been a subject of heated dispute in
the context of other "transatlantic constitution" issues. Given his political
dilemma, Mansfield needed a legal theory that would avoid the imperial
law problem and distinguish between England and the colonies, and the
positive law holding provided it.
There was also an important procedural difference between a "positive
law" ruling and one based on common law, one that had significant po-
litical consequences. The common law and natural law basis of Somerset
counsel's arguments implied that English courts had the power to end or
restrict colonial slavery and at least to restrict, if not to end, the slave trade.
Lord Mansfield could readily foresee that if Somerset were considered
by the Twelve Judges, there might be judges who would want to use this
power as advocated by Somerset's counsel. In addition, as noted above,
the proslavery forces thought that if the issue was elevated to the Twelve
Judges, they would ultimately win. 193 But it is a reasonable inference that
in 1772 such a fight over slavery, which would ultimately occur in the
House of Lords, was a fight Lord Mansfield wanted to avoid, particularly
after Parliament had declined to act at the slaveowners' request.
In 1772, a Parliamentary decision to end slavery in England, and hence
191. E.g., Marchant, Diary, 1:123.
192. Campbell v. Hall. Hardwicke thought all colonies were governed by English law on
slavery (see above, 620-21). Blackstone's position (see above, 612) ignored the uncertainty
and vacillation on this point that led to persistent conflict on the status of American colonies
throughout the eighteenth century. Loughton, Conquest and Settlement, 84-87; Bilder,
Transatlantic Constitution, 39.
193. Manchester Mercury, 2 June 1772, 1.
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to throw into doubt the political, and possibly the legal, foundations of
the slave trade and colonial slavery, would have heaped fuel on the fire of
the growing colonial revolt by threatening an important basis for contin-
ued loyalty to the empire. Having played a central role in defending the
administration position vis-A-vis the colonial rebellion, Lord Mansfield
unquestionably would have been aware of these political implications.
When settlement or legislation did not occur despite Mansfield's concerted
efforts to obtain resolution without a decision, Lord Mansfield was forced
to consider how to avoid future slavery controversies.
The positive law ruling permitted Lord Mansfield to avoid predictable
future disputes with other courts, such as Common Pleas, and the resulting
fight in Parliament. Notably, in making his decision Mansfield reversed
his position-one he took from the beginning to the end of the proceed-
ings-that he would seek the opinion of the Twelve Judges on the issues
raised by Somerset. In fact, Mansfield's decision was designed to prevent
this from occurring.'94
Was treating slavery solely as a matter of positive law a new idea in
English law? None of the earlier slavery cases over more than a century
relied on that principle; instead, they analyzed the issue of slave property
as one controlled by common law principles (e.g., the law of trover). Lord
Mansfield's positive law approach to slavery was a clear innovation (nota-
bly, one suggested several times by Somerset's counsel) that fundamentally
transformed the character of slave property.
At least one possible source of Lord Mansfield's approach can be iden-
tified. During the decade prior to Somerset, Mansfield had been involved
in a series of politically and personally bruising legal and political chal-
lenges to the authority of common law judges, as opposed to juries, and
common law courts, as opposed to Parliament.195 In an important case on
the authority of common law courts, Harrison v. Evans, Lord Mansfield
took the position that the common law could not create a crime where
Parliament had decided none existed. In Harrison, heard in the House of
Lords on appeal in 1767, a London by-law made it an offense punishable
194. There is no evidence that Lord Mansfield polled all of the other judges before an-
nouncing the judgment in Somerset. Bauer, "Law, Slavery," 123 n. 9. Lord Mansfield stated
that the unanimity among the King's Bench judges on the specific point to be decided meant
that further argument-before the other benches-was unnecessary. In short, despite sev-
eral earlier statements that such argument would occur-even if the King's Bench judges
were unanimous-Lord Mansfield sought to limit consideration of Somerset to the King's
Bench.
195. A good survey of the eighteenth-century common law-statute law relationship is
David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1989).
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by a substantial fine for a Dissenter to decline to serve in Corporation of-
fices such as sheriff. 9 6 However, Dissenters were by statute disabled from
serving in such offices. Defending religious toleration, Lord Mansfield
vigorously attacked Blackstone's position supporting the by-law, and the
House of Lords sustained Mansfield's position. Mansfield argued that if
nonconformity were a crime now, it must be by virtue of common law.
He reasoned:
[No usage or custom... makes Nonconformity a crime... .Natural Religion
.. [and] Revealed Religion are part of the Common law.... But it cannot be
shewn from the principles of Natural or Revealed Religion, that ... temporal
punishments ought to be inflicted for mere opinions with respect to particular
modes of worship. Persecution for ... conscience, is not to be declared from
reason or the fitness of things; it can only stand upon positive law .... 197
Based on Harrison, and Mansfield's prior comments in Somerset regard-
ing the desirability of slavery legislation, it seems reasonable to think that
Mansfield did actually say in his Somerset judgment that it was impossible
for "courts of justice" to introduce slavery on natural or moral "reasoning"
or "inferences," as was widely reported in the press at the time, despite
Oldham's favoring the Hill/Balguy report, which omits these words.' 98
Harrison suggests that although there were political motives behind Mans-
field's positive law holding regarding slavery, Mansfield personally agreed
with Somerset's counsel that slavery as a legal institution in both England
and its colonies must be based on positive law.
Colonial Slavery
Despite his threat to rule squarely for one side or the other, Lord Mans-
field's judgment instead created a compromise designed to defuse the politi-
cally dangerous slavery issue, but it was a compromise that had important
implications for colonial slavery.199
Given Harrison, Lord Mansfield surely appreciated that for the slave-
owners, his decision was a "poisoned chalice." A positive law rationale
196. Harrison v. Evans, (1767) 3 Bro. P.C. 465, 1 E.R. 1437, described in detail in Philip
Furneaux, Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice Blackstone Concerning His Exposition of
the Act of Toleration, and Some Positions Relative to Religious Liberty, in His Celebrated
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2d ed. (London, 1771).
197. Furneaux, Letters, 263-64, 278.
198. Oldham, "New Light," 57-60. Oldham is correct that Mansfield wanted any im-
memorial usage allegedly supporting slavery strictly construed.
199. Several writers have argued English law had no effect on colonial law on slavery, e.g.,
Davis, Slavery in Revolution, 469-522, 501 (English courts, including Somerset, permitted
colonial slavery to develop unchecked); Bush, "British Constitution," 388-89 (prerogative
supported the growth of slavery independent of English law); Gould, "Zones of Law,"
471-510.
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without emancipation preserved the short-term political-but not the long-
term legal-status quo on colonial slavery. Although Mansfield protected
the colonial status quo until Parliament acted, he did so by creating a legal
framework that also deliberately devalued slave property and did as much
damage to the legitimacy of the slaveowners' position as possible, short of
an outright ruling against them. Mansfield's deliberate devaluation of slave
property had foreseeable adverse consequences for slavery's continuation
throughout the empire. Not surprisingly, major slaveowner representatives
immediately and vigorously attacked the decision, while abolitionists ap-
plauded it.
Mansfield's comment in the judgment that slavery had originated not just
in England but in every country solely from positive law was a deliberate
effort to demolish legal justification for slavery on any other basis, in Eng-
land as well as in the colonies. Mansfield's positive law holding meant that
slavery existed only within those jurisdictions where positive law sanctioned
it, and only to the extent it was sanctioned. The fact that slavery became
entirely a creature of positive law also meant that it could be selectively
altered or abolished in the colonies. By the late eighteenth century, the
English Crown had limited legal authority to govern in the colonies without
Parliament's acquiescence; therefore, Mansfield's creation of a positive law
framework for slavery in the context of rising abolitionist sentiment laid
the groundwork for Parliamentary control of colonial slavery. 00 Perhaps
equally important was that making slave property a creature of positive law
raised substantial issues about whether compensation to slaveowners would
be required if Parliament chose to alter or abolish slavery.20
Mansfield's positive law holding also knowingly devalued slave prop-
erty by making slave status wholly dependent on the law of individual
jurisdictions, which he (and slaveowners) knew meant that slave flight
would increase because fugitive slaves could become free or protected
against excessive force and compelled return, not just in England but in
the colonies.20 2
200. O'Shaughnessy analyzed the political importance to England of the continued alle-
giance of the West Indies in the American Revolution. One important effect of the Revolu-
tion was to diminish sharply the political force of the British slaveowners' lobby, because
it represented only half as many slaves after the Revolution as before. O'Shaughnessy, An
Empire Divided, xii.
201. The Jamaican Assembly's 1789 protest regarding British slave trade legislation
showed that the Assembly knew there was a substantial question about whether compensa-
tion would be required if slavery was limited. Ibid., 245-46.
202. For example, Spanish Florida, which emancipated British colonial slaves, had there-
fore been a "magnet" for fugitive slaves since the end of the seventeenth century. Ira Berlin,
Generations of Captivity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 44. Mansfield's rul-
ing meant that slaves who escaped there became free not just under Spanish law but under
English law, depriving colonists of any basis for seeking their return or compensation.
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Whether Lord Mansfield qualified his remarks on slavery's origin by
referring to limits on the powers of "courts of justice" to sanction slavery
or not, a larger point remains. Reached after extraordinarily comprehensive
and highly visible public arguments from England's preeminent lawyers,
Lord Mansfield's conclusion on the origin of slavery, even if qualified, was
inevitably, as he well knew, profoundly destructive of the moral and legal
legitimacy of slavery, since it made slave property an artificial creature
of statute and deprived slavery of the sanction of the common law.2 03 The
sanction of the common law was also the sanction of religion and morality
because it was widely believed at the time that they were subsumed within
the common law. Mansfield's argument in Harrison and the religious and
political arguments of Somerset's counsel amply illustrate the power of the
contemporary view that the common law must be consistent with moral-
ity and religious belief. The sweeping nature of Mansfield's statement on
positive law intentionally undermined the moral and religious, and thus
the political, legitimacy of colonial slavery.
Although Lord Mansfield's decision may have bought time for slave-
owners, as intended it was "the handwriting on the wall" for them °. 2 That
colonial slaveowners understood Mansfield's unwillingness to defend their
position largely accounts for their concerted attacks on the judgment that
began almost immediately after it was announced. 20 5 Mansfield's public
defection in Somerset meant that it was really only a question of time until
public opinion deserted slaveowners as well.
The first part of Davis's conclusion in his classic analysis, after re-
viewing English law, including Somerset, that "English courts endorsed
no principles that undermined colonial slave law" was technically ac-
curate, but only because Lord Mansfield deliberately created a means to
distinguish between English and colonial law on slavery in his Somerset
judgment.20 6
Davis's further conclusion that colonial law and English law could
"coexist and even interpenetrate within the larger imperial sphere" was
mistaken formalism.20 7 During the eighteenth century, English common
law and colonial law on chattel slavery were regarded by many, including
prominent English judges such as Lord Chancellor Hardwicke and Mans-
field, as potentially or actually interdependent and were unquestionably
in substantive conflict. Mansfield sought to find a way to avoid explicitly
203. Higginbotham, Matter of Color, 313.
204. Shyllon, Black Slaves, 154.
205. Estwick, Considerations; Edward Long, Candid Reflections on the Negroe Cause
(London, 1772).
206. Davis, Slavery in Revolution, 501.
207. Ibid.
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addressing that conflict by creating a new legal framework for slavery, but
did so quite knowingly at the price of undercutting the legal, economic,
political, and moral basis of slavery as an institution throughout the Atlantic
empire.
Conclusion
The manner in which Mansfield reframed the debate over slavery signifi-
cantly influenced that debate for the next one hundred years. His judgment
contained important silences and ambiguities. Yet, Somerset expanded
freedom when it banished any doubt that English law protected certain
fundamental "rights of man" even for African slaves in England, including
the right of access to the courts to protect against unlawful imprisonment
or abuse, and freedom from chattel slavery. Somerset was also a farsighted
decision to narrow sharply the legal authority for slavery, devaluing slave
property by destroying its "imperial property" status and its moral, and
hence political, legitimacy. Mansfield was a loyal servant of the Crown, but
he was also a friend of justice. Mansfield's decision in Somerset, though
an effort to serve both masters at a time when many thought their interests
conflicted, nevertheless commends him to history.

